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ABSTRACT
The need for both usable and secure authentication is more pronounced than
ever before. Security researchers and professionals will need to have a deep
understanding of human factors to address these issues. Due to their ubiquity,
recoverability, and low barrier of entry, passwords remain the most common means of
digital authentication. However, fundamental human nature dictates that it is
exceedingly difficult for people to generate secure passwords on their own. Systemgenerated random passwords can be secure but are often unusable, which is why most
passwords are still created by humans. We developed a simple system for automatically
generating mnemonic phrases and supporting mnemonic images for randomly
generated passwords. We found that study participants remembered their passwords
significantly better using our system than with existing systems. To combat shoulder
surfing – looking at a user’s screen or keyboard as he or she enters sensitive input such
as passwords – we developed an input masking technique that was demonstrated to
minimize the threat of shoulder surfing attacks while improving the usability of
password entry over existing methods. We extended this previous work to support
longer passphrases with increased security and evaluated the effectiveness of our new
system against traditional passphrases. We found that our system exhibited greater
memorability, increased usability and overall rankings, and maintained or improved
upon the security of the traditional passphrase systems. Adopting our passphrase
system will lead to more usable and secure digital authentication.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
One of the predominant themes in computer security lies in authentication:
addressing how to grant access to authorized users while preventing access to others.
Modern widespread adoption and reliance on computer systems, and online services in
particular, only strengthens the importance of this goal. The traditional focus in
computer security has been on hardening the computer systems themselves, but many
successful attacks have targeted the human component (Tognazzini, 2005). This
suggests a need for security researchers and professionals who possess a strong
background in human factors and usability.
A fundamental issue with digital authentication is the balance between security
and usability. As designers increase the level of difficulty of an authentication process in
order to reduce the frequency of unwanted users gaining access (misses), the
occurrence of legitimate users being denied access (false alarms) likewise increases. The
way to reduce both types of errors is to design systems that better differentiate
between authorized and unauthorized users; this is accomplished by exploiting any
differences between these two groups of users (Tognazzini, 2005).
Although the significant cost of poor security has been extensively covered,
considerably less attention has traditionally been paid to the cost of poor usability in
digital authentication (Sasse & Flechais, 2005). When usability is neglected, a sharp
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decrease in worker productivity, returning customers, or organizational reputation can
often be expected. However, the fact that poor usability can also indirectly lead to
decreased security is often overlooked (Tognazzini, 2005).
People can be quite adaptable when the situation demands it. Since our desire
to maintain the highest possible level of security is trumped by our desire to get things
done quickly and easily, we routinely come up with workarounds that sacrifice security
for usability. This is why, for example, users often reuse passwords across multiple
accounts, write passwords down, or share passwords with others (Sasse & Flechais,
2005).
The challenge in improving existing systems thus results from maximizing the
security benefits while simultaneously limiting the usability regressions. This is what
much of the previous research has focused on – when usability has even been
considered at all. Alternately, we can maximize usability improvements while minimizing
security degradations. Sometimes, it may even be possible to improve both.
The purpose of this research is to apply human factors and usability design to
advance the progress of digital authentication. Chapter 2 provides a review of relevant
topics, starting with an overview of digital authentication and passwords in particular,
including a section covering important technical topics in password theory. Mnemonics,
as they relate to the field of usable security, are covered, as well as input masking and
the threat of shoulder surfing. Finally, the review ends with the topic of passphrases and
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how they differ from passwords, before summarizing how the integration of these
usable security techniques can provide advantages beyond the individual components.
Chapters 3-5 describe novel work done to improve on the usability and security
of existing digital authentication practices. Chapter 3 details the addition of a new
system of mnemonic phrases and user-created pictures to aid in the retention of
system-generated passwords. Chapter 4 expands on the work from the previous chapter
by examining the effects of different methods of creating those mnemonic pictures on
usability and security. Chapter 5 examines different input masking techniques to combat
shoulder surfing during digital authentication, including a novel method intended to
match the usability benefits of cleartext and the security benefits of masked text.
Chapter 6 describes a study that integrates the work from Chapters 3-5 with
passphrases to help facilitate a transition from passwords to passphrases. The
implementation of the new system is detailed in the process. The impetus for a
transition to passphrases is increased security, but usability must also be carefully
considered for this change to be successful. The results indicate that the innovations
from Chapters 3-5 combine particularly effectively with passphrases to address their
major shortcomings.
Chapter 7 concludes by framing the research inside the bigger picture of the field
of digital authentication. First, the main contributions of the research to the field are
summarized. Recommendations and applications are also covered. Finally, Chapter 7
outlines possible directions for future research. Computer security is a dynamic and
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rapidly evolving subject area, and even the best solutions to existing problems must
continue to adapt in order to handle the new problems that inevitably arise.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Digital Authentication
Users can be authenticated by what they know or recognize, what they hold, or
what they are (Renaud, 2005). With the first category, the user and system agree upon a
shared secret during account creation, and the system tests if the user knows the secret
during authentication. This secret is typically in the form of a password. The second
category relies on physical or electronic tokens, while the third category, commonly
known as biometrics, identifies humans by their individual traits or characteristics.
Tokens and biometrics have seen increased usage in recent years, but they have
severe issues that have limited their adoption (Renaud, 2005). Hardware tokens are
more expensive, can be unwieldy to transport and use (especially in multiples), and can
easily be lost or stolen. Software tokens, implemented using public encryption keys and
private decryption keys, are difficult for the majority of users to understand (Whitten &
Tygar, 1999), only work with one particular machine, and are less secure than hardware
tokens. Biometrics depend on a strictly controlled environment, can often be forged
(e.g., by using a photograph to defeat face recognition), and are susceptible to lockout
caused by changes in traits of legitimate users.
A significant drawback with tokens and biometrics is the difficulty in recovering
from user lockout; in comparison, a password can be reset immediately, usually by the
system itself upon request. Because of these combined factors, passwords remain by far
the most common means of digital authentication. Much of the continued lifespan of
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passwords is due to their widespread availability and understandability, traits that
should not change any time in the near future (Herley & van Oorschot, 2012).
Passwords
The process of authentication can always be improved, so researchers and
practitioners have been trying to replace password authentication for decades, on the
grounds of poor usability, security, or both. While passwords have the potential to be
extremely secure, the cognitive demand of having to remember a unique password for
each account often causes users to choose weak passwords or reuse them, drastically
lowering security (Renaud, 2005).
For those who argue that passwords tend to be dangerously insecure, one of the
primary reasons given is that users predominantly create their own passwords. Users
typically prefer to create their own passwords, but user-generated passwords have been
shown to be much less secure than randomly generated passwords created by
computer systems (Proctor, Lien, Vu, Schultz, & Salvendy, 2002).
Many password strengthening techniques have been implemented or suggested,
such as password restrictions, periodic forced rotation of passwords, substitution of
special characters for letters, per-site password modifications, and guidelines like
creating a phrase and using the first letter of each word to form a password. These
degrade usability but commonly do not lead to any appreciable improvement in security
(Kuo, Romanosky, & Cranor, 2006).
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Moving beyond the ubiquitous textual passwords, many researchers have sought
to develop graphical passwords also based on secrets. These rely either on recall – the
same as almost all text-based passwords – or recognition, usually implemented as a
series of prompts that must all be answered correctly to authenticate (Stobert & Biddle,
2013). The series of prompts is necessary to increase the total number of possible
graphical passwords for security purposes. More research focus has been placed on
recognition-based graphical passwords because the nature of displaying pictures lends
itself to recognition tasks.
Graphical passwords based on recognition have been shown to be more usable
than those based on recall (Stobert & Biddle, 2013) – incidentally, the same was not
found to apply to textual passwords (Wright, Patrick, & Biddle, 2012). However, even
using series of prompts, the number of possible passwords in typical implementations
remains relatively low. Passfaces, the canonical example of a graphical password
(Wright et al., 2012), asks users to select the appropriate face out of nine choices, thrice.
Both types of graphical passwords are especially susceptible to the human
tendency of predictability, whether selecting more attractive faces, clicking on hotspots
in an image, or drawing familiar shapes (Suo, Zhu, & Owen, 2005). As graphical
passwords cannot be disguised without a tremendous hit to usability, they are also
particularly vulnerable to attackers who observe the act of authentication – a threat
known as shoulder surfing. Graphical passwords tend to increase login time significantly
over textual passwords (Stobert & Biddle, 2013), which substantially hinder their
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practical, daily use. Finally, there is a relative difficulty in deploying graphical passwords
with existing password systems. Due to these issues, graphical passwords have not
caught on in commercial systems, other than in contexts such as smartphones and
screensavers where they often substituted for previously having no password at all.
Technical Topics in Password Theory
An increasingly popular suggestion made by security professionals is to utilize
password managers (Gaw & Felten, 2006), which allow a user to have one master
password that unlocks many other passwords for individual websites and applications.
Password managers are usually integrated with automatic form fillers so that users need
not even sign in to websites manually. Ideally, the use of password managers should
result in an increase in both usability and security. In terms of usability, the user is freed
from the heavy burden of having to remember dozens of passwords for different
accounts. Because the individual passwords can now all be long, complex, randomly
generated, and unique – thus bypassing the perils of password reuse across accounts,
where the compromise of one account leads to the compromise of many – security is
likewise improved (Gaw & Felten, 2006).
Despite the seemingly superior nature of password managers, few users actually
employ them. One key reason why this is true is the important issue of trust (Karole,
Saxena, & Christin, 2010). Online password managers have proven to be the most
usable (Karole et al., 2010), but they are also the least likely to be trusted, due to
security concerns. Users don’t trust they will always have access to their passwords if
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something goes wrong. They worry that their master password being stolen will lead to
all of their accounts being compromised; this is true, but no different from the popular
single sign-on (SSO) model or losing an e-mail account that can then reset the passwords
of all of the other accounts.
For many users, the hassle and uncertainty make setting up a password manager
not worth it. Even out of the people who do use password managers, most of them do
not use them in conjunction with more complex passwords (Gaw & Felten, 2006), thus
deriving only a usability benefit and no security benefit. Regardless of the future
adoption of password managers or single sign-on, users would still require one truly
secure master password – which they have largely proven unable to create – so security
researchers and professionals would not find their jobs made any easier.
When discussing password security, a fundamental question is if online or offline
attacks are being considered. Because websites can limit the number of repeated login
attempts made by one IP address or for one account, the required level of security for
online attacks tends to be much lower.
Almost all of the newsworthy security breaches in the headlines are instead
cases where the web server is compromised and the attackers can download and attack
the passwords offline. When the passwords are stored on a server simply as cleartext,
which is rare but does still happen, all of those passwords are instantly stolen.
The minimal line of defense is hashing the passwords on the server. A hash
function is an algorithm that takes a large, variable amount of input and transforms that
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into a small, fixed output. For example, if someone wants to check if the large file he or
she downloaded is uncorrupted, it would be best to simply check the published hash for
that file to see if it matches. Because they were designed for this type of use, the vast
majority of hash functions are designed to operate as quickly as possible (while also
satisfying other mathematical properties).
Hashing is important to password storage because the hashes can be stored and
the passwords themselves discarded (Teat & Peltsverger, 2011). When a user tries to log
in using a password, the server simply runs the hash function again on the password and
checks if the hash matches. Although an attacker can’t work backwards to derive a
password from a hash, he or she can make guesses at the password, run the same hash
function (which is easily determined), and see if the result matches the stolen hash.
Offline, with no lockouts based on the number of failed attempts, the attacker can keep
going as long as he or she wishes. As computing power increases, the number of
attempts that can be made per second also rises.
To make things even more efficient, an attacker can pre-compute hashes from
many inputs, which can be stored and loaded into memory. This is a classic timememory tradeoff, and a common implementation as it relates to passwords is called a
rainbow table (Avoine, Junod, & Oechslin, 2008).
These attacks are defeated by a process called salting, whereby a random (but
not necessarily secret) piece of data is stored for each account. The salt is passed to the
hash function every time along with the entered password, which results in a different
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(but still consistent) hash for that account. This makes it infeasible for rainbow tables to
pre-compute all of these new hashes (Teat & Peltsverger, 2011), as common password
input now becomes uncommon input.
There is one specific idea in the field of password theory, known as key
stretching (Percival, 2009) – hardly ever considered by any of the numerous alarmist
articles about massive password leaks – which renders calculations of how long it would
take to crack a certain password even more inaccurate. Hash functions are generally
designed to work quickly, and in fact most passwords today are hashed on web servers,
unsalted, using MD5, an extremely fast hash function from 1992. The reports of billions
of passwords being tested per second are calculated under these ideal conditions.
There also exist a set of hash functions that are designed specifically to protect
passwords; they take an exceptionally large amount of computation to complete and
even allow parameters to be specified that roughly control how long they take through
repeated hashes. The most prevalent security-focused hash functions are PBKDF2,
bcrypt, and scrypt (Percival, 2009). If a legitimate user must wait an additional 50
milliseconds to be authenticated, this is essentially transparent, but it means an attacker
could only make at most 20 attempts per second.
Key stretching is not a panacea for password security. Weak passwords that are
easily guessed will still be easy to crack, and impractically strong passwords wouldn’t
have been cracked anyway, but for the many passwords that fall somewhere in the
middle, key stretching is a valuable asset – and the idea will continue to be in the future.
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From a practical standpoint, it means that passwords should try to be strong enough to
reach that range where they need to be attacked by brute force instead of heuristics. If
nothing else, key stretching serves as a reminder that like most aspects of computer
security, the battle between users and attackers is like an escalating game of tug of war
where both sides adapt – but we certainly aren’t doomed to lose.
Mnemonics for Passwords
The fundamental issue with all types of user-generated passwords is that
humans are not random creatures. We behave in patterns, and we remember
information more readily when some sort of order is imposed. This very fact makes that
information easier to guess. Of course, the disorder of randomly generated passwords
makes them hard for people to use. But instead of starting with a nonrandom phrase
and working backwards to form a nonrandom password, we can instead begin with a
random password and then generate a mnemonic phrase to better remember it. For
instance, rather than deriving jajwuth from the well-known Jack and Jill went up the hill,
which results in a weaker password, the randomly generated jpwjaop can instead be
converted to Jill’s pet wolf just ate our pizzas.
This mnemonic phrase can be created by either the user (Scarfone & Souppaya,
2009) or the system. Taking a random password and converting it to a phrase can prove
quite difficult and time-consuming for users, suggesting a potential advantage for
system-generated mnemonic phrases (Jeyaraman & Topkara, 2005).
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Previous attempts at generating mnemonic phrases automatically, such as a
fairly complex system by Jeyaraman and Topkara (2005), have focused on linguistic
techniques such as natural language processing and personalized corpuses. However,
the produced mnemonics, such as Basotho orthoper, shoots dais, toes Yakut hack from
bosdtyh, have not been found to be usable or memorable.
Since the translation from randomly generated password to mnemonic phrase is
only to aid the user’s memory, and the phrase itself is not used in authentication, there
is no change in security. Therefore, a simple solution imposing maximum order (e.g.,
converting bosdtyh to Barbara’s other squirrel definitely took your hotcakes) should
work best. The effectiveness of the system could be further enhanced by utilizing a
mnemonic picture, which Nelson and Vu (2010) showed to improve the memorability of
user-generated passwords.
Goverover, Basso, Wood, Chiaravalloti, and DeLuca (2011) found that combining
multiple recall strategies often improves memorability by more than any single strategy
can alone. In the context of password recall, we can utilize multiple mnemonic
strategies simultaneously, including cues, the generation effect, and the self-reference
effect.
Cues have been shown to enhance the recall of items with which they are
associated (Slamecka & Graf, 1978). In this context, we can employ user-created
pictures to help cue the recall of phrases to bolster password recall. Cues that are more
strongly associated with the target items to remember and hold large amounts of
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information tend to be the most effective (Greenwald & Banaji, 1989). Hence, pictures
that contain more information should more effectively cue password recall than
pictures that hold less information do. However, if the pictures contain too much
information about the authentication secret or are too strongly associated with the
phrase (Mäntylä, 1986), attackers will have an easier time decoding the pictures.
But pictures need not contain large amounts of generalizable information in
order to be strongly associated with a target item for a given person. The generation
effect demonstrates that creating cues oneself rather than simply combining pieces of
information together can additionally increase recall (Craik & Tulving, 1975). Because
the generation effect works only for the person who created the artifact, users who
design their own pictures should benefit from improved password recall (Bertsch, Pesta,
Wiscott, & McDaniel, 2007), yet the chances of an attacker finding the password should
not increase.
More specifically, creating pictures through the process of drawing may increase
the benefits of the generation effect over simply using online images. With drawings,
users generate the entire picture rather than merely linking images together in the
process of compilation. Furthermore, drawing images may incite the self-reference
effect: the enhancement of recall when referring to the self (Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker,
1977). This is because the very nature of drawing an image may often be more personal
than combining found images.
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Input Masking
Even if the underlying authentication systems have been designed and
implemented properly, the very act of authentication itself can also be a soft spot for
unauthorized users to attack. One such method, known as shoulder surfing, entails
looking at a user’s screen or keyboard as he or she enters critical electronic input such
as a password or credit card number. Different techniques are employed to hide
sensitive input, such as the common practice of replacing entered text with bullets. Such
techniques increase security but inevitably degrade the usability of the process by
making it harder for the user to see what he or she is entering.
Even bullet-masked input may not be enough to stop determined attackers.
Although looking at the screen is easier whenever possible, shoulder surfers can still
look at a user’s keyboard. In fact, they can also employ hidden cameras, keyloggers, or
other devices to capture what is being typed without the need to be physically present
(Wiedenbeck, Waters, Sobrado, & Birget, 2006).
The response by many researchers to this situation has been to design systems
with increased resistance to shoulder surfing but a marked decrease in usability.
Complicated schemes have been implemented based on ideas such as convex hull clicks
(Wiedenbeck et al., 2006), probabilistic cognitive trapdoor games (Roth, Richter, &
Freidinger, 2004), and cued gaze points (Forget, Chiasson, & Biddle, 2010).
It has been argued that bullet masking is not secure enough to warrant the cost
to usability. Influential usability consultant Jakob Nielsen started a controversy when he
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recommended on his website that most passwords should be displayed as cleartext
instead of bullet-masked due to usability concerns (2009). While the usability of bulletmasked input could be improved, there are obvious security concerns with simply
showing passwords as cleartext.
Because of the low level of planning, equipment, or technological sophistication
required of the attacker (Hoanca & Mock, 2005), shoulder surfing is widely available as a
form of attack. This greatly increases the pool of would-be assailants beyond merely the
domain of dedicated experts.
Passphrases
The idea of a passphrase can be seen as an extension to the traditional
passwords used in digital authentication. They fulfill the same role as a secret that the
user demonstrates to the system that he or she knows in order to prove personal
identity. Therefore, like passwords but unlike other proposed replacements for
passwords such as tokens or biometrics, passphrases should also prove to be easy to
implement, easy for users to understand, and easy for users to recover from lockout.
The fundamental feature of passphrases is that they are longer than passwords.
The primary motivation for this change is to increase the level of security, particularly
against brute-force attacks, which occur when an automated attack is conducted not by
making informed guesses but by exhaustively trying all the possible permutations in a
given password space (Herley & van Oorschot, 2012). As the price for large quantities of
distributed computing power becomes increasingly affordable, making brute-force
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attacks more viable, there is renewed interest in moving from shorter passwords to
longer passphrases – not to use as mnemonics but as the actual secret texts themselves
(Burr, Dodson, & Polk, 2006).
From a human factors standpoint, the key benefit of passphrases is that they
allow the secret to be much less complex, and thus more memorable, while still
maintaining or increasing security. Using a dataset of 12,000 actual passwords, Kelley et
al. found that a password policy of “anything at least 16 characters long” was much
stronger than any policy requiring at least 8 characters plus all the possible restrictions
(e.g., character types, repeated characters, dictionary checks) commonly found today
(2011). Likewise, Komanduri et al. found that the most effective combination of security
and usability resulted from long passwords with no other restrictions (2011).
In mathematical terms, by increasing the number of characters, the total number
of bits of entropy – which can be thought of as the randomness, disorder, or security of
a password – can be maintained while greatly lowering the number of bits of entropy
per character. Randomly selected characters would produce the greatest amount of
entropy (as each character is independent), while English-language phrases would
exhibit far less (as the letter q would almost always be followed by u).
According to guidelines from the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) (Burr et al., 2006), the first character of an English-language phrase encapsulates
approximately 4 bits of entropy, the next seven characters represent 2 additional bits of
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entropy each, the next twelve characters represent 1.5 bits of entropy each, and every
subsequent character adds 1 additional bit to the calculated entropy.
To illustrate with a previous example, “Jill’s pet wolf just ate our pizzas”
(
) would be
stronger than even a randomly generated 7-character password using uppercase and
lowercase letters, numbers, and symbols
(

). When taking

into account that user-created passwords exhibit far less security than systemgenerated ones, the difference drastically increases.
The first known mention of the idea of using a longer phrase in lieu of a
traditional password comes from a paper by Sigmund Porter (1982). Just three years
later, Kurzban created a system-generated passphrase system using words randomly
chosen from a set of wordlists (1985). The resulting passphrases needed to be
abbreviated since authentication systems of the day typically did not support passwords
with double-digit length.
This technical issue was a major reason why the use of passphrases did not catch
on in the following years. But with the necessity of higher levels of security in recent
years due to the vast increase in widely available computing power, as well as the
steady obsolescence of legacy authentication systems (Keith, Shao, & Steinbart, 2007),
interest in passphrases is the highest it has ever been.
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Keith, Shao, and Steinbart tested the memorability of user-created passphrases
and found that while the memorability of the passphrases themselves was no better or
worse than that of passwords, login success rate was significantly lower because of a
significant increase in typographical errors (2007). This finding suggests that combining
passphrases with techniques that reduce errors made while entering passwords, as
discussed in Chapter 5, could mitigate this effect.
Around the same time, Kuo, Romanosky, and Cranor evaluated the security of
user-created passphrases and found that the security benefit of this group of
passphrases was lower than the security community expected (2006). This was because
users frequently selected weak phrases based on topics such as lyrics, movies, literature,
or television shows. This research recommended the possibility of using systemgenerated passphrases, such as an extension of the system-generated phrases discussed
in Chapters 3 and 4, instead of user-created ones.
One of the most popular recommendations in the online security community for
creating system-generated passphrases is Arnold Reinhold’s Diceware (2012), first
demonstrated in 1995. This system utilizes a wordlist containing 7,776 words – not all of
which can be found in an English dictionary – and suggests that the user rolls five
physical dice to determine each word in the passphrase; Reinhold recommends using
five words in each passphrase (2012) for future-proof security. Observations among
security professionals indicated that Diceware did not see much use in practice during
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the years following its creation, and little research was initially conducted about the
usability of the system.
As a result, Leonhard and Venkatakrishnan (2007) tested the usability of
Diceware passphrases containing three words each. They found that Diceware
performed poorly, with users rating their satisfaction with their password at 1.71 out of
5. Because the wordlist was so large, passphrases such as lares ave ghent were possible,
suggesting that perhaps using a smaller wordlist would produce more memorable
passphrases.
Despite any usability issues Diceware may have, as well as its failure to gain
traction with typical users, Diceware has started to see some implementation in
security-conscious circles. Diceware has been used since 2012 by the leading privacyfocused search engine DuckDuckGo to store user settings, and it is recommended by the
password manager 1Password to create the master password (Shiner, 2013). The recent
use of Diceware in the wild mirrors the general need to switch to passphrases from
passwords for increased security.
To examine the effect of different wordlists on randomly generated passphrases,
Shay et al. conducted a study using 1,476 online participants and a variety of systemgenerated passphrase conditions, including passphrases with wordlists of size 181, 401,
and 1024 consisting of three and four words (2012). There was found to be little
difference between wordlists of these sizes. Memorability was affected more by the
number of characters in the passphrase rather than the number of words, reflecting the
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typographical errors found by Keith, Shao, and Steinbart. Interestingly, the Diceware
wordlist prioritizes short words (Reinhold, 2012).
Integration of Techniques
The system-generated mnemonic phrases of Chapters 3 and 4 work directly with
existing password systems because the passwords themselves, not the mnemonics, are
stored. Nevertheless, as the majority of systems these days support longer passphrases,
the work in Chapters 3 and 4 could be extended to generate passphrases instead of
passwords. In this scenario, the user would type Jill’s pet wolf just ate our pizzas instead
of using the phrase to remember jpwjaop. Because the individual words chosen would
now impact security, this change would necessitate greatly expanding the size of the
wordlist while attempting not to erode the usability benefit resulting from the
specialized wordlist. In essence, the generated passphrases should still involve simple
words and maintain a simple structure.
Shay et al. recommended that perhaps the most promising area for improving
memorability of passphrases lies in asking users to construct a scene or story relating to
their passphrase (2012). The work discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 found that asking users
to create a mnemonic picture to assist them with system-generated passphrases did
improve the level of usability of those passphrases.
The new input masking technique covered in Chapter 5, which also works easily
with current password systems and policies already in place, could be extended to
handle passphrases and other forms of readable text. When rotated by character,
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readable input text tends to stand out amidst a sea of unreadable decoy text. For
instance, Jill’s pet wolf just ate our pizzas might be surrounded by Utww!d ape hzwq
ufde lep zfc atkkld or Hgjj/q ncr umjd hsqr yrc msp ngxxyq, which would make it easy for
attackers to find the genuine passphrase.
By incorporating a dictionary component into the system, readable text could be
masked with other readable decoy text. Since typing errors are expected to increase as
text string length grows and as typing speed rises due to the use of plain language
passphrases, the proposed system might enjoy additional benefits when compared to
other input masking techniques.
The hope is that by leveraging both the natural tendency of passphrases to imply
a mental scene, as well as the reduced typographical errors resulting from usable input
masking, passphrases can overcome their current limitations and see wider adoption.
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CHAPTER 3: MNEMONICS TO AID SYSTEM-GENERATED PASSWORD RETENTION
Introduction
This chapter is based on previously published work (Juang, Ranganayakulu, &
Greenstein, 2012).
The impetus for this study is the idea that user-generated passwords have been
shown to be insecure, while system-generated passwords have been shown to be
difficult to use. The majority of prior work has attempted to increase the security of
user-generated passwords, while this study focuses on increasing the usability of
system-generated passwords.
The first innovation of this study is the implementation of a specialized wordlist
and template to generate consistently simple mnemonic sentences to help users
remember their passwords, with no resulting change in security. Previous research in
password mnemonics resulted in complex phrases that users did not like.
The second innovation is prompting the user to generate a mnemonic picture
during account creation that is shown during the login process. This transforms the login
task from one of uncued recall to more memorable cued recall.
We aim to investigate the effect that these contributions have on the usability
and security of system-generated passwords. We hypothesize that they increase
usability but that the mnemonic picture slightly decreases security of the system.
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Implementation
The basis of our mnemonic phrase system relies on the realization that we can
use a tiny specialized wordlist to construct our mnemonics from any given password.
Since the mnemonic itself has no bearing on security, but functions only as an aid to the
user, even a single sentence template with a direct mapping of letters to words is
acceptable. We can thus design our exact wordlist and character positions so that all
possible combinations make meaningful sense and only use simple grammar and
vocabulary, as seen in Figure 1.

Figure 3.1. The system-generated mnemonic is designed to be simple.
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We were able to come up with an appropriate word for each possible letter.
However, some positions of particular letters (such as q, x, and z) resulted in words that
could be considered difficult, especially to some of the international students in our
pilot study. In addition, certain words that were easy for one person sometimes proved
difficult for another, due to background or culture differences.
Because of these issues, we decided to screen the entire wordlist with people
from different cultures. After being identified as difficult by more than one person,
words and the letters in positions that would lead to those words were removed for the
purposes of our study. Our system is robust enough that minor deletions or additions to
the wordlist hardly affect its security, but to be fair, we screened out the same positions
of letters from all conditions in our study.
A visual aid during login is the next major component of our system. Upon
presenting the user with an automatically generated mnemonic during account
creation, a simple paint program and a browser window are also opened by the system.
By default, the browser window displays automatically generated search results of
images related to the mnemonic.
The user’s task is to draw a personal visual reminder, of any size, in the paint
program. For convenience, images found in any image search or elsewhere on the Web
can be copied and pasted directly into the paint program. The user can copy as few or as
many images as he or she wishes. As illustrated in Figure 2, the picture is typically
decipherable only by its creator.
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Since our system opens the appropriate file in the paint program and later
automatically saves it, the user does not need to specify or upload the finished file. This
picture is then displayed back to the user on the login screen when he or she attempts
to sign in later.

Figure 3.2. The mnemonic phrase and picture complement each other as simple, effective memory aids.

Method
Threat Models and Limitations
For our study, an adversary is assumed to have complete knowledge of our
implementation, including the wordlist. We wanted to test the ability of users to
remember passwords for multiple accounts simultaneously, as prior research has
focused on single accounts. Naturally, this greatly increases task difficulty and
consequently lowers memorability.
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Although we have followed the NIST level 2 guidelines for authentication
security (Burr et al., 2006) of at least 30 bits of entropy
(

), distributed

computing power has been greatly expanding. Should the current system-generated
passwords become too weak to withstand brute-force attacks, it is trivial to modify our
system to generate longer passphrases instead of mnemonics for passwords. On the
other hand, to protect against adversaries who know our specific system, the wordlist
would be expanded but could still retain simple words as best as possible. Additional
sentence templates would also be added.
In our study, we did not force participants to take a specified amount of time to
create their account. While the effect of condition on memorability could be mediated
by creation time, if the system-generated mnemonic policy naturally encourages the
user to think more deeply about the mnemonic, we feel this indirect effect is every bit
as important as the direct effect of condition on memorability.
The use of pictures in our system leaks a small amount of information out to
potential adversaries. We did not prohibit participants from creating laughably insecure
“pictures” such as the original password in text form. Perhaps because they did not
mind the task, or they understood the drawbacks, none of our participants created such
weak pictures.
After our initial study was completed, we decided to quantitatively test the
security of our system. We asked participants in a follow-up study to attempt to guess
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previously created passwords. All of these participants created three passwords using
our system and were provided with general and system-specific password guessing tips,
as well as full knowledge of our implementation including the complete wordlist used.
Subjects
We recruited 54 college students (34 males, 20 females), ranging from age 19 to
35, via word of mouth and promotional fliers posted in several locations on campus.
Each participant was compensated $8 for taking part in our study. All participants had
over five years of computer experience and normal or corrected-to-normal eyesight.
Experimental Design
The study utilized a between-subject design. Participants were assigned to
conditions based on a balanced Latin square. Participants created three passwords using
one of the mnemonic policies investigated:
1. None: the user is not instructed to utilize any mnemonic aid
2. User-generated: the user creates his or her own mnemonic phrase based on
guidelines from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (Scarfone
& Souppaya, 2009)
3. System-generated: the user receives a randomly created mnemonic phrase
(as specified in the earlier Implementation section) and then creates a
mnemonic picture depicting the phrase
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Procedure
Each session started with a brief overview of the study, after which participants
signed an informed consent form and completed a short pre-test demographic
questionnaire.
Regardless of condition, each user received three system-generated passwords
in sequence, one at a time. For each password, the participants were asked to memorize
the password and then enter it when ready to create an account. Participants were
instructed to pay close attention to which passwords corresponded to which accounts.
Depending on the condition, part of the memorization process might have
involved creating or reinforcing a mnemonic. Upon successful entry of the given
password, the process was repeated until all three accounts were created.
Participants then completed the NASA Task Load Index (NASA-TLX) (Hart &
Staveland, 1988) and the System Usability Scale (SUS) (Brooke, 1996). These tests
measured the workload and usability of the account creation task.
After a five-minute distraction task of solving two-digit mental arithmetic
problems, participants moved to the authentication phase. One of the three accounts
was randomly selected and users were prompted to sign in using the appropriate
password. Participants were given a maximum of five attempts to sign in successfully
before a failure was recorded instead. The process was then repeated until the login
task was completed for all three accounts.
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Finally, participants completed another NASA-TLX and SUS. This time, these tests
measured the workload and usability of the password recall task. The total time
required to complete the experiment was approximately thirty minutes.
Approximately a week after each participant’s first session, he or she was invited
back for a second session to repeat the recall tasks. Participants were specifically
instructed not to write down or rehearse their passwords in the meantime.
Subsequently, twenty-four participants were tasked with attempting to guess
the passwords of five accounts: three of the system-generated mnemonic condition and
two of a no-picture control condition, representing the other conditions. The system
treated these adversaries in exactly the same manner as ordinary users, including the
five attempts allowed.
Dependent Variables
All measures, both objective and subjective, were recorded by the system:


Creation time: seconds taken to create an account, measured from the
presentation of the system-generated password to the successful account
creation



Recall time: seconds taken to either succeed or eventually fail to sign in to an
account, measured starting from the presentation of the login screen



Damerau-Levenshtein distance (Damerau, 1964) for both effectiveness and
security: the length in edits (total sum of single character insertions,
deletions, substitutions, and adjacent transpositions needed to transform
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one string to another) between the participant’s recollection or guess of a
password and the actual stored password


Jaro-Winkler proximity (Winkler, 1990) for both effectiveness and security:
the similarity or correlation between the participant’s recollection or guess of
a password and the actual stored password, normalized such that 0 indicates
no similarity and 1 indicates equality



Success: a binary metric of either eventual success or failure to sign in



Creation and recall NASA-TLX indices addressing mental demand, physical
demand, temporal demand, performance, effort, and frustration, each on a
7-point Likert scale



Creation and recall SUS scores addressing usability, each out of a total of 100
possible points
Results

We used SPSS 19 for the data analysis. For the majority of our dependent
variables, we used a one-way ANOVA with a 95% confidence interval to determine
significance. Welch’s correction was used whenever variances were heterogeneous.
Given significant results, Tukey’s HSD test showed which mnemonic policies differed
significantly from one another. The Games-Howell test was used in place of Tukey’s HSD
whenever variances were heterogeneous.
Since the creation time and recall time did not follow a normal distribution, a log
transformation was first applied to each of these to achieve normality. The same type of
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ANOVA as before was then conducted. The security measures used t-tests. Success was
analyzed using a binary logistic regression.
Objective Measures
Efficiency. The results indicate a significant difference for creation time (F=326,
p<.001) but not for first-session recall time (F=2.41, p=.093) or second-session recall
time (F=0.476, p=.622). The creation time in seconds was shortest for the mnemonic
policy of none (M=32.0), next shortest for user-generated mnemonic (M=107), and
longest for system-generated mnemonic (M=338). The mean first-session recall times in
seconds were 46.6 for none, 78.8 for user-generated mnemonic, and 60.0 for systemgenerated mnemonic. For the second session, the mean recall times were 70.8, 94.9,
and 69.4 seconds, respectively.
Effectiveness. There were statistically significant differences for first-session
(F=22.3, p<.001) and second-session Damerau-Levenshtein distance (F=17.3, p<.001),
and, as seen in Figure 3, first-session (F=17.7, p<.001) and second-session Jaro-Winkler
proximity (F=14.3, p<.001). The Damerau-Levenshtein distance (first-session; secondsession) was shortest for system-generated (M=0.150; M=0.930), next shortest for usergenerated (M=1.35; M=3.15), and longest for none (M=2.54, M=3.43). The Jaro-Winkler
proximity (first-session; second-session) was highest for system-generated (M=.987;
M=.928), next highest for user-generated (M=.892; M=.750), and lowest for none
(M=.768; M=.726). For both measures, there were no significant differences between
the second session of user-generated and none.
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Figure 3.3. 2nd-session Jaro-Winkler proximity (larger values indicate increased effectiveness)

The effect of mnemonic policy on success was also determined to be statistically
significant for both the first session (χ2=29.8, p<.001) and second session (χ2=13.8,
p=.001). The first-session success rate was 87.0% for system-generated, 53.7% for usergenerated, and 38.9% for none. As seen in Figure 4, the second-session success rate was
59.3% for system-generated, 33.3% for user-generated, and 25.9% for none. These
represent drop-offs of 31.8%, 38.0%, and 33.4%, respectively, between first and second
sessions.
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Figure 3.4. 2nd-session success rate (larger values indicate increased effectiveness)

Security. There was a statistically significant difference for the DamerauLevenshtein distance between the adversaries’ guesses and the actual passwords
(F=8.31, p=.005). The Damerau-Levenshtein distance was longer for the no-picture
condition (M=6.40) than the system-generated mnemonic condition (M=5.67), as shown
in Figure 5. There was no statistically significant difference for the Jaro-Winkler
proximity between the adversaries’ guesses and the actual passwords (F=0.999, p=.320).
The mean Jaro-Winkler proximity was .428 for the no-picture condition and .499 for the
system-generated mnemonic condition. These values can be seen in Figure 6. No
password was successfully guessed.
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Figure 3.5. Adversarial Damerau-Levenshtein distance (larger values indicate increased security)

35

Figure 3.6. Adversarial Jaro-Winkler proximity (smaller values indicate increased security)

Subjective Measures
Workload. The only workload metric to achieve significance in the creation task
was mental demand (F=3.81, p=.029). The mental demand was significantly lower for
system-generated (M=4.94) than none (M=6.00). For first-session recall workload,
mental demand (F=5.02, p=.010) and effort (F=4.14, p=.022) proved statistically
significant. The mental demand of system-generated (M=4.00) was significantly lower
than user-generated (M=5.56) and none (M=5.78). System-generated (M=3.44)
participants rated their effort in the first-session recall task as significantly lower than
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did participants who did not use a mnemonic (M=4.94). There were no significant
differences in workload for the second session.
Usability. In the creation (F=9.53, p<.001), first-session recall (F=7.05, p=.002),
and second-session recall (F=7.66, p=.001) tasks, differences in the SUS measure were
statistically significant. The usability score (creation; first-session recall; second-session
recall) for system-generated (M=66.0; M=68.3; M=66.7) was significantly higher than
user-generated (except for second-session) (M=50.6; M=46.8; M=51.2) and none
(M=41.1; M=43.2; M=37.8). The usability scores for second-session recall can be seen in
Figure 7.

Figure 3.7. 2nd-session SUS score (larger values indicate increased usability)
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Discussion
As a whole, the results indicate a promising outlook for the use of mnemonics to
help users remember system-generated passwords. That outlook is particularly hopeful
for our implementation of system-generated mnemonics.
Although the creation time for the system-generated mnemonic condition was
much longer than the other conditions, account creation is a one-time event where
successfully encoding the password into memory is much more important than the
speed of the process. A forgotten password could potentially cause a far greater loss of
time down the road than any initial time investment.
In contrast to creation time, any differences in recall time would lead to a
cumulative effect over repeated logins. Therefore, it is encouraging that differences in
recall time were not statistically significant between any of the conditions, although
system-generated mnemonics and the absence of a mnemonic tended to be faster than
user-generated mnemonics.
Regarding security, the Damerau-Levenshtein distance is useful primarily as a
measure of strength against brute-force attacks. While the security of our system as
measured this way was significantly lower than the control condition, the mean
difference was less than three-fourths of a character. On the other hand, there was no
significant difference in Jaro-Winkler proximity, which is useful primarily as an indication
of strength against human-based attacks.
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When participants created pictures, the weakest parts of the mnemonic phrases
tended to be the nouns. This suggests that the possible addition of one non-noun to
each phrase could cover the Damerau-Levenshtein difference, hopefully without
degrading usability. It is worth emphasizing that when compared to the status quo of
user-generated passwords, all of the conditions tested would be far more secure.
The results for recall Damerau-Levenshtein distance and Jaro-Winkler proximity
show that whether we evaluate only exact matches or take near misses into account,
there are clear divisions in memorability. System-generated mnemonics consistently
performed better than the other two conditions.
By looking at the success rates for the three conditions, we see that a user
utilizing a system-generated mnemonic is 1.78 times likelier to succeed in recalling his or
her password than someone using a user-generated mnemonic and 2.29 times likelier to
succeed than someone using no mnemonic.
The SUS scores indicate that users generally considered the system-generated
mnemonic condition to be the most usable. The NASA-TLX results show that participants
using system-generated mnemonics were not subjected to increased workload levels. If
anything, their ratings tended to be more favorable compared to ratings for the other
conditions, even during the account creation task.
By striving to outperform the security of user-created passwords and improve on
the usability of randomly assigned passwords, we developed a system-generated
mnemonic implementation using a tiny specialized wordlist along with picture creation
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and display. We demonstrated that users with system-generated passwords can benefit
from increased memorability and usability by adopting our system.
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CHAPTER 4: METHODS OF MNEMONIC CREATION FOR AUTHENTICATION
Introduction
This chapter is based on previously published work (Fraune, Juang, Greenstein,
Chalil Madathil, & Koikkara, 2013).
The study in Chapter 3 determined that mnemonic phrases and images increased
the usability of system-generated passwords. However, security was slightly decreased.
In that study, we allowed participants to choose between drawing a picture, arranging
online images into a collage, or combining both drawings and online images. In addition,
there was no condition that tested system-generated mnemonic phrases with no
picture aid.
This study investigates the effect of different types of picture generation. All
conditions utilize system-generated passwords as well as system-generated mnemonics.
Our goal is to identify specifically which aspects of picture generation, if any, exhibit the
largest effects on the previously demonstrated usability improvements. If a particular
method proves most effective, we can use this method exclusively in future work. On
the other hand, if there are hardly any differences between picture methods (excluding
the no picture condition), we may still want to standardize the procedure for
consistency. If we find no differences between any of the conditions (including the no
picture condition), this would suggest that the previous usability improvements were
entirely due to the system-generated mnemonic phrases.
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Based on the generation and self-reference effects, we hypothesize that the
drawing condition might be the most memorable, followed by the combined condition,
then the online image condition, then a steep drop-off to the no picture condition. This
mirrors the level of involvement required of the user in picture creation.
Likewise, because user-drawn pictures should provide less shared information
than found images located by an online search engine, we hypothesize the drawing
condition to be the most secure of the picture conditions, followed by the combined
condition, and then the online image condition. The no picture condition would exhibit
the greatest level of security since no picture cues are provided to potential attackers.
Method
Experimental Design
The study used a within-subjects design to test the effectiveness of different
types of user-made pictures as mnemonic devices to cue the recall of phrases that in
turn represent computer-generated passwords. Another within-subjects design was
employed to evaluate the success of using pictures to attempt to crack users’
passwords.
Participants
Twenty-nine participants were recruited from Clemson University by word of
mouth and e-mail for a convenience sample. Recruits who failed to pass a test for color
blindness were screened out, and 24 participants (14 males, 10 females), ranging from
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age 21 to 38, were ultimately included in the study. No attrition occurred between
sessions.
Procedure
In both sessions, participants worked at a desktop computer, and a researcher
explained the purpose of the study. After signing the informed consent form,
participants completed a demographic questionnaire and a test for color blindness
(Ishihara, 1987). They then received training for the password creation system, covering
the following points:
1. For each password, the system generates a random string of seven lowercase Latin letters (e.g., “blmiccs”)
2. For each password, the system generates an English phrase such that the
first letter of each word corresponds to a letter in the password (e.g., the
password “blmiccs” corresponds to the phrase, “Barbara’s little mouse
intently chewed countless sandwiches”)
3. For each phrase, the user is asked to create a picture in accordance with
further instructions
4. Tips for creating secure images are provided (e.g., do not include words from
the phrase in the picture)
After training, the computer presented four successive account login screens
along with four unique corresponding passwords and phrases that they were asked to
memorize in relation to the accounts. For each phrase, participants were prompted to
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create a digital picture using one of the following methods. Conditions were presented
in a counterbalanced order across subjects to minimize order effects:
1. NP – participants made no picture
2. D – participants drew a picture using a paint application
3. OI – participants used online images to create a picture or collage
4. DOIC – participants combined drawings and online images in a paint
application
After creating each account, participants completed the NASA Task Load Index
(NASA-TLX) (Hart & Staveland, 1988) and the System Usability Scale (SUS) (Brooke,
1996) to assess the workload and usability of the system. Participants created all four
accounts, and then completed a five-minute mental arithmetic distractor task. For the
second part of Session 1, participants were prompted to type their passwords into the
matching accounts in a randomized order. For all conditions except the No Picture (NP)
control, participants were shown the pictures they had previously created. Five
unsuccessful login attempts were deemed an overall failure for the particular account,
and participants proceeded to the next task. Again, participants completed the NASATLX and SUS after each condition. Session 1 lasted approximately forty-five minutes.
Session 2 occurred roughly one week after initial participation. Participants
returned to the study location and repeated the second part of Session 1. Participants
who did not remember their passwords during Session 1 were still invited back to try
again in Session 2. They were not reminded of their passwords after Session 1 failure.
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Participants then simulated attackers trying to decode others’ passwords.
Participants were given general and system-specific training on how to crack passwords
from pictures, and participants were also provided the list of 182 words from which the
computer generated the phrases to match the passwords in order to simulate an
attacker that might have used the system until discovering all or most of the words
used. Participants attacked two accounts of each of the four different conditions, all for
different users. For each account, participants were asked to make at least one attempt
and allowed up to five attempts to login. Session 2 lasted about thirty minutes.
Measures
The computer recorded the time users took to memorize passwords, including
the time to create the picture. Then, for every login attempt, of “user” and “attacker,”
the system recorded the following:


Time taken to correctly enter each password



Success: a successful or failed login attempt



Damerau-Levenshtein distance (Damerau, 1964): the length in edits (total
sum of single character insertions, deletions, substitutions, and adjacent
transpositions needed to transform one string to another) between the
participant’s typed password and the actual password



Jaro-Winkler proximity (Winkler, 1990): the similarity between the
participant’s typed password and the actual password, normalized from 0 to
1
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NASA-TLX scores to measure workload of creating the picture and
memorizing the password, and of the two login processes



SUS scores to measure the usability of creating the picture and memorizing
the password, and of the two login processes
Results

Data were analyzed using SPSS 19. For most data, repeated measures withinsubjects 4 (condition) x 2 (session) ANOVAs were run. For login success, a binary logistic
regression was performed. If Mauchly’s test of sphericity was insignificant at the .05
alpha level, sphericity was assumed. If sphericity was violated, a Greenhouse-Geisser
test was performed with appropriate corrections. Two-tailed Pearson’s tests were used
for correlations. For post-hoc analyses, LSD was used with a Bonferroni correction to
adjust for multiple comparisons, and a simple effects test was used to evaluate
interactions.
Creation. Analysis revealed a statistically significant difference between
conditions in creation time (F=27.2, p<.001), as seen in Figure 8. The only significant
difference was that NP (M=61.3) took the least amount of time to create (D: M=390; OI:
M=434; DOIC: M=451).
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Figure 4.1. Account creation time (smaller values indicate increased efficiency)

Recall. No differences were found for recall time for successful logins among
conditions (F=0.509, p=.677) or between sessions (F=0.241, p=.625), and no interaction
was found (F=2.49, p=.067).
Login. Condition had no significant main effect on login success (χ2=6.11,
p=.106), as shown in Figure 9, although the mean success rate for NP was lower than
the other conditions. Differences among sessions were found to be significant (χ2=14.0,
p<.001), with participants succeeding more during Login 1 (success rate of 52.1%) than
in Login 2 (success rate of 26.0%). No interaction was found between Condition and
Session (χ2=0.450, p=.929).
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Figure 4.2. Success rate: login (larger values indicate increased effectiveness)

Figure 10 indicates that Condition affected Damerau-Levenshtein distance
(F=6.93, p=.002), as did Session (F=22.4, p<.001). Participants in NP (M=2.92) had a
larger Damerau-Levenshtein distance than those in other conditions (D: M=1.52; OI:
M=2.75; DOIC: M=2.63), indicating that participants entered passwords less accurately
during NP than in the Picture conditions across Logins 1 and 2. No differences were
found among the Picture conditions. A larger Damerau-Levenshtein distance was also
observed during Login 2 (M=2.35) than in Login 1 (M=1.21). No significant interactions
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occurred between Condition and Session for Damerau-Levenshtein distance (F=0.590,
p=.550).

Figure 4.3. Damerau-Levenshtein distance: login and attack (smaller values indicate increased similarity)

Condition and Session affected Jaro-Winkler proximity (Condition: F=7.78,
p=.002; Session: F=19.9, p<.001), as seen in Figure 11, but there was no significant
interaction between Condition and Session for Jaro-Winkler proximity (F=0.220, p=.767).
During the NP condition (M=.724), participants had significantly lower Jaro-Winkler
proximities than in the other conditions (D: M=.885; OI: M=.879; DOIC: M=.910),
meaning that they were further from the password in the NP condition than in the
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Picture conditions. No significant differences were found among other conditions
(p>.999). Jaro-Winkler proximity was higher during Login 1 (M=.899) than Login 2
(M=.800).

Figure 4.4. Jaro-Winkler proximity: login and attack (larger values indicate increased similarity)

Security. During attacks, no significant effect was found for Condition on
Damerau-Levenshtein distance (F=2.37, p=.078), as seen in Figure 10, or on Jaro-Winkler
proximity (F=0.520, p=.668), as seen in Figure 11. Time taken to attack correlated with
success determining passwords, as measured by Damerau-Levenshtein distance (r=.153, p=.009) and Jaro-Winkler proximity (r=.164, p=.005).
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Subjective Ratings. NASA-TLX scores indicated higher ratings of physical demand
(F=7.13, p=.002) during Creation than Login 1 (p=.003) or Login 2 (p=.031). NP was rated
consistently lower in physical demand than the other conditions (p<.001). While DOIC
was rated much less demanding during Logins 1 and 2 than Creation (p<.001), D was
rated more demanding during Login 1 than Creation and Login 2 (p<.001), and OI was
rated less demanding during Login 1 than during Creation and Login 2 (p<.001).
Participants rated their performance (F=15.7, p<.001) worse during Login 2 than
during Creation (p<.001) or Login 1 (p<.001). Similarly, frustration (F=7.73, p=.001) was
rated higher during Login 2 than during Creation (p=.005) or Login 1 (p=.040).
The usability of the systems (F=7.70, p=.001) was rated lower for Login 2 than
during Creation (p=.013) or Login 1 (p=.011), as seen in Figure 12. Analysis revealed no
main effects of Session on the remaining subjective ratings or of Condition on any
subjective ratings.
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Figure 4.5. SUS: creation and login (larger values indicate increased usability)

Discussion
Account creation took longer in the Picture conditions than in the No Picture
(NP) condition. However, no significant differences were found in recall time, success
rates, or security among conditions. The increased memorability of passwords in the
Picture conditions (according to Damerau-Levenshtein distance and Jaro-Winkler
proximity) may justify the extra time required to create accounts, though it has not yet
been shown if participants would willingly take the extra needed time to create the
accounts.

52

As expected, login success, measured by success rate, Damerau-Levenshtein
distance, and Jaro-Winkler proximity, dropped from the first to second session,
confirming that participants tend to forget their passwords over time. Complementing
these findings, participants rated Login 2 as characterized by more failure, less usability,
and more frustration than Login 1. No differences were found for ratings of mental or
temporal demand or effort. The low success rate (20-60%) was also expected because
participants were asked to memorize four passwords at once and did not use them for a
week; in practice, expected success rates for any one of these conditions would be
higher.
Although no significant differences were found among conditions for login
success, more sensitive measures (Damerau-Levenshtein distance and Jaro-Winkler
proximity) revealed that creating pictures increases password memorability. This
suggests that in the study in Chapter 3, the top performance of the system-generated
mnemonic and picture condition was due, at least in part, to picture creation. However,
it is unclear whether this benefit is due to creating the picture during account creation
(employing the generation and self-reference effects), viewing the picture during login
(to cue recall), taking more time to create the account, thinking more deeply about the
phrase due to picture creation, or a particular combination of the above. Future studies
might unpack these considerations in order to develop a more focused approach to the
present authentication system.
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Both Damerau-Levenshtein distance and Jaro-Winkler proximity (which are
better suited to measure the threat of brute-force and guessing attacks, respectively)
indicated that Picture conditions were no easier to crack than the No Picture (NP)
condition. Time spent attempting to crack accounts correlated with coming closer to
cracking them, suggesting that effort moderated cracking success.
Future studies might investigate the possible additional security gleaned from
varying the structure of computer-generated phrases. This would not be expected to
decrease memorability because participants would still see only one phrase structure
per password. In fact, different phrase structures may help differentiate among
accounts and decrease interference among phrases. Although the system’s current
small word bank relies on familiar words to make phrases more memorable, increasing
the word bank might also enhance security by making pictures less susceptible to attack.
This study revealed that when computer-generated random passwords are
combined with computer-generated mnemonic phrases, user-created pictures assist in
password recall, enhancing usability without compromising security.
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CHAPTER 5: INPUT MASKING TECHNIQUES FOR AUTHENTICATION
Introduction
This chapter is based on previously published work (Juang & Greenstein, 2011).
In contrast to Chapters 3 and 4, which dealt primarily with bolstering the
memorability of system-generated passwords, the study in this chapter investigates how
to increase the usability of the actual login process. When a user authenticates to a
system, there are different methods that may be used to hide the login input from
shoulder surfers.
At the extreme end of focusing entirely on usability, the text can be displayed as
cleartext. At the opposite end of focusing solely on security, no feedback at all can be
displayed to the user. In between these extremes are all the possible input masking
techniques that aim to strike a balance between usability and security. The majority of
previous work has attempted to strengthen security beyond the status quo of bullet
masking, while this study focuses on improving on the usability of bullet masking.
The main innovation of this study is the implementation of a novel input masking
technique that hides the login input in plain sight using decoys. The user can see the
correct input in real time as it is being entered, while a shoulder surfer would not know
which input on the screen is legitimate.
We aim to examine the effect that different input masking techniques, including
our new system, have on the usability and security of the login process. We hypothesize
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that our new system combines the usability benefits of cleartext with the security
benefits of no feedback.
Implementation
We present Purloin: a novel input masking technique based on the concept of
hiding something in plain view, from Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Purloined Letter.” We
accomplish this without needing to alter the display of the sensitive input itself. Instead,
by using superfluous input (decoys) to mask legitimate input, we strive to combine the
usability advantage of unmasked text with the security advantage of masked text.
Purloin relies on the addition of any amount of decoy text surrounding typed
text, as seen in Figure 13. The correct input text is automatically mapped to a certain
color and position, which are tied together for redundancy. As a result, once the user
first determines where to look, he or she will always know where to look for all future
attempts. On the other hand, a shoulder surfer should not be able to tell where to look.
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Figure 5.1. The decoy text obfuscates the password while also acting as a trap for potential attackers.

If the text to be entered is already known by the system, it can be mapped to a
consistent position; otherwise, the position would have to be decided randomly. Even if
the system does not know what the user will enter a priori, the user can still determine
the appropriate position as he or she types. The decoy text is generated by applying a
Caesar cipher (character-rotational encryption) to the plaintext input for each decoy.
Letters, numbers, and symbols are all rotated within their own space so that each
character is replaced with the same type of character. Each decoy is shifted by a
different amount when possible, in order to avoid duplication of characters.
If submitted input text is incorrect but can be rotated into the correct text,
Purloin knows a shoulder surfing attack has occurred and can lock out and record the
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attacker and notify the legitimate user. This provides resistance against a camera-based
attack that seeks to try each row one at a time.
In the case of repeated shoulder surfing, a dedicated attacker with long-term
physical access could still try to figure out which text remains consistent across input
sessions. This type of attack is prevented if the system stores both the text to be
entered and the associated decoys. All rows can then be displayed consistently across
sessions. Although this method requires additional information to be stored by the
system, the result is an increase in security with no adverse effect on usability.
Based on a pilot study, we settled on ten rows of text as a tradeoff between
security and usability. Once color was included to help signify the uniqueness of each
row, the participants in our pilot study were able to quickly determine how to use
Purloin without instructions. Providing basic support on first use would still make sense
in a production environment, so the user is not startled.
We created a working Purloin implementation in Java 6 as well as a system for
running the experiment, including faithful implementations for other common input
masking techniques. We selected colors for Purloin such that no adjacent positions
would be difficult to distinguish for all major types of color-blindness.
Method
Threat Model and Limitations
For our study, a shoulder surfer was defined as an adversary with the ability to
listen to the surroundings and observe the user’s screen (a standard 17-inch monitor)
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and QWERTY keyboard. The shoulder surfer was allowed any technique to obtain the
input – including taking notes – other than physical contact or looking at the user’s
provided sheet of assigned text. The user was allowed any technique to prevent the
shoulder surfer from succeeding other than physical contact.
All input to be entered was in the form of randomly generated lowercase
alphanumeric text strings (sequences of characters) of length eight. Although these did
not represent “typical” weak user-generated passwords, they were in line with existing
security guidelines for creating strong passwords (Burr et al., 2006). Participants were
given practice with our assigned input strings, but their level of experience with the
input would nevertheless be much higher with passwords that were already familiar to
them.
The participants took turns as both the user and shoulder surfer, so they were
well aware that the study involved testing computer security. In fact, because of these
dual roles, participants tried hard to thwart their respective partner in a friendly bid to
outperform the other. In the wild, many users do not realize when they are being
shoulder surfed, and shoulder surfers are not free to act without fear of being caught.
Ethical considerations would have to be addressed when conducting a real-world
shoulder surfing study.
Subjects
We recruited 14 senior or graduate level engineering students (11 males, 3
females), ranging from age 22 to 28, via word of mouth. They were split into seven pairs
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of participants. All participants had over five years of computer experience and normal
or corrected-to-normal eyesight.
Experimental Design
The study utilized a within-subject repeated measures design. Participants were
assigned to conditions based on a balanced Latin square to minimize order effects.
Participants completed all of the input masking techniques investigated:
1. Cleartext: no input masking (displayed as normal text)
2. Invisible: no on-screen indication for typed text (usually seen in command
line interfaces)
3. Bullet-masked: one bullet per typed character (ubiquitous on both the
desktop and online)
4. Interval-masked: each newly typed character transforms into a bullet after
the following character is typed or a 2-second interval has passed (usually
seen in mobile devices)
5. Decoy-masked: typed text is hidden in plain view with the addition of decoy
text surrounding it (see earlier Implementation section for Purloin)
“Bullet-masked with a checkbox to toggle into cleartext” was also considered,
but our pilot study showed that users almost never selected the checkbox even when
left alone and explicitly told they were in a secure location. Users typically claimed the
checkbox was unnecessary since they could supposedly input text just fine without it,
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and so it was not worth the effort to click it. Regardless of the validity of these claims,
these findings made the inclusion of this technique redundant for this study.
Procedure
Each session started with a brief overview of the study, after which participants
signed an informed consent form and completed a short pre-test demographic
questionnaire. One participant was randomly selected to begin as the user and the
other as the shoulder surfer.
For each masking technique, each user completed a set of three text strings. For
each string, the user entered the text five times correctly. Incorrect inputs prompted the
user to try again. On the fifth time for each string, the shoulder surfer was allowed that
one opportunity to observe. Next, the shoulder surfer was asked to enter the observed
text as accurately as possible using a second keyboard. Upon completion of each
masking technique, the user completed the NASA Task Load Index (NASA-TLX) (Hart &
Staveland, 1988) and an abridged set of seven questions taken from the Computer
System Usability Questionnaire (CSUQ) (Lewis, 1995).
After completing the entire list of fifteen inputs, the user assigned a unique
ranked preference for each input masking technique during a short post-test
questionnaire. Participants were given the chance to take a break before switching roles
and repeating the procedure. The total time required to complete the full experiment
was approximately one hour.
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Dependent Variables
Objective measures were recorded by the system:


Damerau-Levenshtein distance (Damerau, 1964): the length in edits (total
sum of single character insertions, deletions, substitutions, and adjacent
transpositions needed to transform one string to another) between the
shoulder surfer’s observation and the actual input



Jaro-Winkler proximity (Winkler, 1990): the similarity or correlation between
the shoulder surfer’s observation and the actual input, normalized such that
0 indicates no similarity and 1 indicates equality



Task completion time: mean time in seconds of all (five) correct inputs for
each string, measured for each input from the first typed character to
eventual successful entry



Error rate: the number of incorrect inputs plus the number of times the user
restarted (by hitting backspace at least three consecutive times to clear the
entire input), divided by that sum plus the number of correct inputs (five)

Subjective measures were completed by the participants on paper forms and
tallied during data analysis:


CSUQ questions addressing ease of use, effectiveness, efficiency, perceived
security, learnability, recoverability, and satisfaction, on a 5-point Likert scale



NASA-TLX indices addressing mental demand, physical demand, temporal
demand, performance, effort, and frustration, on a 7-point Likert scale

62



Preference rankings for usability, security, and overall, determined by
assigning each input masking technique a unique number from 1 to 5

Distance was chosen instead of simple match rate because an adversary would
still be able to launch a successful attack by programmatically examining close text
strings. The NASA-TLX was used to evaluate whether the added complexity or
distraction of input masking contributed to user workload.
Results
We used SPSS 18 for the data analysis. For the majority of our dependent
variables, we used a repeated measures one-way ANOVA with a 95% confidence interval
to determine significance. Welch’s correction was used whenever variances were
heterogeneous. Given significant results, Tukey’s HSD test showed which input masking
techniques differed significantly from one another. Since the error rate and user
preference rankings did not follow a normal distribution, we used a Friedman test for
each of those measures. We then used pairwise Wilcoxon signed-rank tests with DunnŠidák correction to see which techniques differed significantly.
Objective Measures
Security. The results indicate significant differences for Damerau-Levenshtein
distance (F=46.8, p<.001) and Jaro-Winkler proximity (F=33.3, p<.001). The DamerauLevenshtein distance was shortest for cleartext (M=0.640), next shortest for intervalmasked (2.38), and longest for the subset of invisible (5.57), bullet-masked (5.79), and
decoy-masked (5.64). This is shown in Figure 14. The Jaro-Winkler proximity was higher
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for cleartext (.958) and interval-masked (.856) than it was for invisible (.595), bulletmasked (.580), and decoy-masked (.558), as seen in Figure 15.
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Figure 5.2. Damerau-Levenshtein distance (larger values indicate increased security)
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Figure 5.3. Jaro-Winkler proximity (smaller values indicate increased security)

Usability. As seen in Figure 16, there was no statistical significance for task
completion time (F=0.533, p=.712). The error rate (χ2=22.9, p<.001) was higher for
invisible (M=.094), bullet-masked (.091), and interval-masked (.087) than it was for
cleartext (.015) and decoy-masked (.020), as shown in Figure 17.
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Figure 5.4. Task completion time (smaller values indicate increased efficiency)
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Figure 5.5. Error rate (smaller values indicate increased effectiveness)

Subjective Ratings
Usability. The invisible masking technique was rated lower for ease of use,
effectiveness, efficiency, and learnability than the other input masking techniques. For
recoverability (F=25.3, p<.001), invisible (M=1.71) was also rated lowest, with bulletmasked (3.14) rating lower than cleartext (4.50) and interval-masked (3.71). For
perceived security (F=7.91, p<.001), cleartext (1.79) rated significantly lower than
invisible (3.86), bullet-masked (4.07), and decoy-masked (3.79). Cleartext (2.50) was also
rated lower than bullet-masked (3.71) and decoy-masked (3.79) in terms of overall
satisfaction (F=3.61, p=.010). These results are shown in Figures 18 and 19.
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Figure 5.6. The first three subjective usability ratings (larger values indicate increased usability)
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Figure 5.7. The last four subjective usability ratings (larger values indicate increased usability)

Workload. There was no statistical significance (p>.05) for physical demand,
temporal demand, performance, or frustration. For mental demand (F=3.91, p=.007),
invisible (M=4.36) was rated significantly higher than cleartext (1.79). Invisible (4.36)
was rated higher than cleartext (2.29), bullet-masked (2.29), and interval-masked (2.43)
in terms of effort (F=4.37, p=.003).
Preference Rankings
Usability. The rank of invisible (M=5.00) was significantly worse (χ2=39.9, p<.001)
than all others: cleartext (1.29), bullet-masked (3.21), interval-masked (2.86), and
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decoy-masked (2.64). In addition, bullet-masked and interval-masked ranked worse than
cleartext, the category winner. These results are displayed in Figure 20.

Figure 5.8. Preference rankings (smaller values indicate increased preference)

Security. Based on experience gained from both the user and shoulder surfer
perspectives, participants ranked cleartext (M=5.00) significantly worse (χ2=42.6,
p<.001) than all others: invisible (1.36), bullet-masked (2.50), interval-masked (3.64),
and decoy-masked (2.50). Interval-masked ranked worse than invisible and bulletmasked, the category winners. Although the bullet-masked and decoy-masked means
were identical, the variability for decoy-masked was higher.
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Overall. Based on the entire range of factors in selecting an input masking
technique, cleartext (M=4.50) ranked significantly worse (χ2=29.5, p<.001) than bulletmasked (2.14), interval-masked (2.71), and decoy-masked (1.79). Furthermore, invisible
(3.86) ranked significantly worse than decoy-masked, the overall winner.
Discussion
The results support several conclusions with practical ramifications for input
masking policy. Cleartext performed worst in both objective and subjective measures of
security. Invisible input performed worst in both objective and especially subjective
measures of usability and workload. These were the least preferred input masking
methods overall.
Purloin (decoy-masked) appeared to indeed capture the best of both worlds, as
it was the only input masking technique to place in the highest significant subset for
objective measures of both security and usability. Notably, low error rates resulted from
being able to see the entire input text as it was being entered. Subjective ratings for
Purloin were also highly favorable. In addition, it exhibited the best overall preference
ranking, although this ranking did not differ significantly from bullet-masked or intervalmasked input.
Conversely, interval-masked input appeared to combine the worst of both
worlds, as objective measures placed it at the bottom or near-bottom for both security
and usability. Its subjective ratings and preference rankings were quite positive
nonetheless. Tari, Ozok, and Holden had previously shown the rift between perceived
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and actual shoulder surfing threat levels for graphical and non-dictionary passwords
(2006). Interval-masked implementations are currently most prevalent on mobile
devices. We strongly recommend against their use in desktop settings, but we would
have to study mobile usage before making suggestions for that domain.
While conducting the experiment, we noticed that two participants devised a
clever attack on Purloin. Because the user often hovered over the first key before
beginning to type, these shoulder surfers were able to determine the first character and
then locate the row on the screen that started with that character. After the study
concluded, we modified the system to display the same initial characters on every row.
The remaining characters follow the original algorithm.
The effects of reduced screen space on Purloin have yet to be studied. While a
desktop system can display an overlay to deal with an overcrowded screen, physical
limitations of mobile devices would necessitate smaller text size, tighter spacing,
multiple columns of text in each row, or simply fewer rows.
One possible next step in our research with Purloin is to examine the interaction
effects between type of input text and input masking technique. Since errors are
expected to increase as the text string length or complexity grows, Purloin might see
increased benefits when used with stronger passwords containing upper case and
symbols. There might also be advantages for plain language passphrases, as the number
of errors would be expected to increase along with increased typing speed and number
of characters typed.
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Purloin does not currently handle readable text gracefully, as readable input text
tends to stand out amidst a sea of unreadable decoy text. We plan to incorporate a
dictionary component into our system to support the masking of readable text by using
words in the decoy text.
The widespread use of bullet-masked implementations appears to be supported
by our results. While cleartext enjoys at the very least a concession of security for
usability, we do not see any situations on the desktop for which it would be preferable
to switch from bullet-masked to either invisible or interval-masked input. On the other
hand, the results of this study support the idea that a switch to Purloin should increase
usability with no loss in security.
One of the greatest benefits of Purloin is the ease of transition from existing
input masking techniques. Unlike more complicated shoulder surfing resistant schemes,
Purloin is simple enough to require neither instructions nor special equipment such as a
touchscreen or eye tracker. Perhaps most importantly, it works cleanly with the
password systems and policies already in deployment today.
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CHAPTER 6: INTEGRATING MNEMONICS, INPUT FEEDBACK, AND PASSPHRASES
Introduction
The state of the art in the area of passwords lies in their longer, more readable
cousins: passphrases. The theory is that the added length of passphrases should result in
an increased level of security, while their word-based nature should simultaneously
result in an increased level of usability. The drive behind a move to passphrases comes
from a need to combat the progressing insecurity of passwords, as well as the ability of
modern authentication systems to support passphrases.
Running parallel to the existing work in passwords, which focused mainly on
user-generated passwords, the majority of prior research and in-the-wild
implementations of passphrases has centered on user-generated passphrases. However,
researchers have found that the memorability of user-generated passphrases was no
different from that of user-generated passwords (Keith et al., 2007). The security benefit
of user-generated passphrases has also been considered disappointing, as users often
select relatively weak passphrases (Kuo et al., 2006).
Previous attempts at system-generated passphrases have produced passphrases
that have been demonstrated to be difficult to use (Leonhard & Venkatakrishnan, 2007).
The likely cause is utilizing a wordlist that contains far too many words, resulting in
individual words that can be extremely uncommon and hard to remember.
Both user-generated and system-generated passphrases suffer from a great
usability concern during authentication: typographical errors. Often when the user has
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recalled the passphrase correctly, login will still fail due to erroneous input caused by a
lack of feedback provided by standard input masking techniques.
The research in this chapter incorporates the three major innovations from
Chapters 3-5: a specialized wordlist and sentence template, a user-created mnemonic
picture that provides cued recall, and a decoy-based input masking technique. We apply
these innovations to system-generated passphrases, with the expectation that they will
prove particularly well suited to passphrases. In the process, we hope to advance the
state of digital authentication.
Implementation
We implemented a new system that integrates our previous contributions (a
specialized wordlist and sentence template, user-created mnemonic pictures shown
during login, and a decoy-based input masking technique) with system-generated
passphrase authentication. The basis for our system is the automated mnemonic phrase
generator used in Chapters 3 and 4. However, instead of merely using the generated
phrase to remember a system-generated password, the user now inputs the phrase
directly to sign in.
The user-created mnemonic pictures were incorporated, with no significant
changes necessary, into the existing authentication system from the work in Chapters 3
and 4. Furthermore, the decoy-based input masking technique from Chapter 5 was
integrated with the existing authentication system in the formation of our new system.
The decoy-based input masking technique was modified such that decoys are drawn
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from the other words in the wordlist. Without this change, it would be easy for a
shoulder surfer to identify the legitimate line amidst the character-rotated gibberish.
Unlike in Chapters 3 and 4, since the generated phrase itself is now the
authentication secret, the design of the wordlist must be changed to effect the security
enhancements of a passphrase. It proved to be a delicate balance to expand the size of
the wordlist to increase security while ensuring that the usability of the system was not
degraded. Our goal was to maintain the usage of simple words.
We developed two different wordlists that can be used with our new system,
differing primarily in the sentence structure they embody. The first passphrase structure
is not actually based on any designed sentence structure. Instead, one wordlist is used
for all of the words in the passphrase. Although different types of words are in the
wordlist, the permutation of words is not guaranteed or expected to make semantic or
even grammatical sense; this lack of formal structure matches the majority of existing
system-generated passphrases. Each of the four words in the passphrase is drawn
randomly without replacement from the wordlist.
Users are shown four randomly selected passphrases (e.g., succeed complete
murder aid, weak parade of chemistry, point local instrument pain, and weigh in jewel
girl) and are given the opportunity to choose the passphrase out of the four that they
are most comfortable with. The wordlist used is based on the 1510-word Special English
list (Kelly, 2010). The exact wordlist was determined through pilot testing to filter out
problematic words. Sixty words were removed to maintain the desired 40 bits of
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entropy; the rationale and calculations behind this decision are covered at the beginning
of the Method section.
The second passphrase structure is based on the existing 7-word sentence
structure from Chapters 3 and 4. The associated wordlist was manually expanded
beyond 26 animals, 26 adjectives, 26 actions, 26 foods, and so forth. Since English
speakers know comfortably many more than 26 each of these types of words, we found
that we were able to maintain the usage of simple words while increasing the level of
security. In fact, we were even able to eliminate the need for one of the words, resulting
in a new 6-word sentence structure with varying numbers of possibilities for the
different word positions. These values were selected to maintain the same 40 bits of
entropy as the first passphrase structure; these calculations are likewise covered at the
beginning of the Method section. Again, the exact wordlist was determined through
pilot testing to screen out problematic words.
Implementation Considerations
Shay et al. (2012) determined that roughly 1000 to 2000 words is a reasonable
size for wordlists for system-generated passphrases. In fact, to avoid reinventing the
wheel, our original idea for our new system was to reuse the same 1024-word list from
their paper, derived from the most common words in the Corpus of Contemporary
American English (COCA). A survey of available wordlists found that none of them fit our
requirements perfectly for system-generated passphrases, although some came closer
than others. This is due to the differences between the purposes behind the design of
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most wordlists and the requirements for a usable passphrase-generating wordlist. Some
of these concerns, in roughly descending order of importance, include:


The wordlist is too large (e.g., Diceware list, Crypt::Diceware).



The wordlist is outdated (e.g., Basic English, General Service List).



The wordlist is domain-specific (e.g., Business English, Simplified Technical
English for aerospace, Dolch Word List for children).



The wordlist is commercialized, or the methodology behind its construction
is unclear (e.g., Globish).



The wordlist contains American-centric proper nouns (e.g., XKPasswd) or
British spellings (e.g., Oxford English Corpus list).



A wordlist based on the most common words may contain proper nouns,
abbreviations, and slang (e.g., COCA). It may be especially volatile over time.
It may also include semantic duplicates that cause interference with one
another.



A wordlist based on teaching English as a second language (e.g., Special
English, Basic English, General Service List) may contain words that are
prioritized as being useful to learn – perhaps appearing frequently in news
articles or travel conversations – rather than simple.

Taking into account these issues, we decided the best fit was to start with the
1510-word Special English list (Kelly, 2010). This wordlist was created in 1959 by Voice
of America (VOA), the official external broadcaster of the United States government,
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and updated regularly since. It is aimed at international listeners and English learners. As
stated earlier, pilot testing was conducted to eliminate the more troublesome words.
An additional benefit of basing our wordlist on the Special English list is that each
word in the list comes with a simple definition. Our system incorporates these
definitions as tooltips, so that a user who does not understand a particular word can
mouse over the word to receive a definition. This proves to be especially helpful since
our system relies on user-created mnemonic pictures.
For the decoy-based input masking to function appropriately, the previous
method of a rotational cipher was changed. In the new system, the decoys come from
other words in the wordlist. We considered prioritizing the decoy words for each
legitimate word by selecting decoys that are most similar to the legitimate word. While
this would possibly increase the security against shoulder surfing, it would also decrease
the resistance against human guessing, as attackers would be able to begin guessing
near the similar decoys.
The fundamental issue here is that the more the decoys are based on the
passphrase, the more information is leaked during guessing attacks. Even using decoys
from the same wordlist or sentence structure leaks information about the wordlist or
sentence structure, but this is considered an acceptable tradeoff.
If security against camera-based shoulder surfing attacks is instead the top
priority, our system can be adapted to generate consistent decoys in the same cohort of
similar words and always in the same order. In a simplified example with three rows,
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buck, bump, and bust would always result in those three words in the same rows, no
matter which of the three was typed. This design decision is so an attacker cannot
record the screen with a camera and later determine which input results in the recorded
screen. The system can also detect what has been typed so far and identify a shoulder
surfing attack by noticing an in-progress typed decoy, even if that decoy is never actually
submitted as a login attempt. The system would then lock out and record the attacker
and alert the legitimate user of the shoulder surfing attack.
Maximizing the similarity between decoys would provide better defense against
shoulder surfers who attempt to look back and forth between the user’s fingers and the
screen. This system could still defend against intrusion attempts by detecting attacks on
decoy passphrases and words, but testing would show if the false alarm rate (i.e.,
locking out legitimate users) can remain absolutely at zero. Whereas with the rotational
cipher, it would be extraordinarily unlikely for a decoy to be accidentally typed, it is
relatively more feasible that a legitimate user could type buck instead of bump.
As previously stated, the user-created picture aids were readily integrated into
the new system without further changes. The user’s interaction with the system has
changed somewhat, since the generated passphrases are different from the previous
mnemonic phrases, but the implementation of the system itself remains the same. In
contrast to complex character-based passwords containing letters, numbers, and
symbols, the word-based structure of passphrases allows the user to envision a scene or
story about the authentication secret (Jeyaraman & Topkara, 2005).
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There is one last consideration concerning the simultaneous display of
mnemonic pictures with decoy masking. Since a shoulder surfer could see which of the
possible decoys best fits the picture, the combination of the two techniques could result
in a degraded level of security against shoulder surfing attacks. This attack would be
particularly effective when carefully reviewing a camera recording. To defend against
this potential vulnerability, we hide the picture by default and allow the user to show
the picture. The user can still receive memory assistance when necessary (e.g., when
learning a new passphrase or for less commonly used passphrases), but frequently or
publicly used passphrases need not always have their picture displayed.
A final addition to the basic system-generated passphrase system is the idea of
error correction to reduce typographical errors, also known as automatic spell checking.
Because the wordlists we use are tremendously smaller than a wordlist found in a word
processor or web browser, our system is able to correct to the intended word more
aggressively and accurately. This is accomplished by converting the user’s input to the
word in the wordlist with the shortest Damerau-Levenshtein distance (the identical
word in case of a match); the word with the highest Jaro-Winkler similarity is used in
case of a tie. Damerau-Levenshtein distance (Equation 1) and Jaro-Winkler proximity
(Equation 2) are formally defined:
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With our system, if a word in the correct passphrase is bump, then bmup would
also be accepted. If an attacker is attempting to input a decoy such as bust, close
typographical errors such as bush should still resolve to the closest word, which is a
decoy in this case. Because we correct to both legitimate words and decoys with equal
weight, the security of our new system remains unaffected.
Method
Independent Variable
The goal of this research is to examine the effect of authentication scheme on
the usability and security of digital authentication. Accordingly, the main independent
variable in the study is authentication scheme; session is another independent variable,
but we are only interested in its interaction with authentication scheme, not any main
effects.
The following conditions were selected to fulfill 40 bits of entropy, which is a
commonly used level of security for passwords protecting valuable resources (Biancuzzi,
2006; Hruska, 2011; Shiner, 2013). The security of the system can then also be enhanced
through key stretching (i.e., repeated password hashing designed to increase
computation time) (Percival, 2009). The first two conditions represent the most
common and recommended currently available passphrase systems, and the last two
represent our new system using two different wordlists:
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1. A user-generated passphrase of at least 24 characters (including spaces) with
no other restrictions (see Figure 21). No mnemonics are used, and the input
masking is standard bullet masking. (

) (Burr et al., 2006)
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Figure 6.1. The user-generated passphrase condition (#1) appears similar during creation and login.
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2. A system-generated passphrase utilizing three words drawn randomly
without replacement from the Diceware8k list (Reinhold, 2012)
supplemented with Beale’s alternate list (Reinhold, 2012) and the shortest
words from the 1Password expanded English Diceware list (Shiner, 2013),
totaling 10326 unique words (see Figure 22), i.e. “Diceware10k.” No
mnemonics are used, and the input masking is standard bullet masking.
(

)
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Figure 6.2. The Diceware10k system-generated passphrase condition (#2) results in shorter passphrases.

88

3. A passphrase chosen from a set of four system-generated passphrases, each
utilizing four words drawn randomly without replacement from an abridged
version of the Special English list (Kelly, 2010) containing 1450 words with
definition tooltips (see Figure 23). A user-created mnemonic picture is shown
during login, error correction is enabled, and the input masking is decoy
masking. (
)
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Figure 6.3. The Special English wordlist condition (#3) allows the user to select one of four passphrases.
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4. A system-generated passphrase utilizing a 6-word sentence structure based
on the 7-word structure from Chapters 3 and 4, with an expanded number of
possible randomly drawn words for each location (see Figure 24). A usercreated mnemonic picture is shown during login, error correction is enabled,
and the input masking is decoy masking. (
)

(
)
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Figure 6.4. The 6-word sentence condition (#4) shows the mnemonic picture when selected by the user.
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Dependent Variables
Our study employed both quantitative and qualitative measures. The
quantitative dependent variables measured the security and usability of the
authentication schemes. The data for these objective measures were recorded by the
system:


Recall time: seconds taken to either succeed or eventually fail to sign in to an
account, measured starting from the presentation of the login screen



Damerau-Levenshtein distance (Damerau, 1964) for recall effectiveness,
shoulder surfing security, and cracking security: the length in edits (total sum
of single character insertions, deletions, substitutions, and adjacent
transpositions needed to transform one string to another) between the guess
of a passphrase and the actual stored passphrase



Jaro-Winkler proximity (Winkler, 1990) for recall effectiveness, shoulder
surfing security, and cracking security: the similarity or correlation between
the guess of a passphrase and the actual stored passphrase, normalized such
that 0 indicates no similarity and 1 indicates equality



Recall success: a binary metric of either success or failure to sign in



Shoulder surfing resist success: a binary metric of either resisting shoulder
surfing or failing to do so



Cracking resist success: a binary metric of either resisting cracking or failing
to do so, based on guesses by human attackers
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Cracking resist attempts: the number of attempts taken by a machine to
crack the passphrase

It is worth noting that creation time was not included as a dependent variable,
although we had previously measured creation time in our studies from Chapters 3 and
4. We stated that the effect of condition on performance could be mediated by creation
time, but that we also valued the indirect effect of encouraging the user to think more
deeply during account creation. For this study, we decided to examine the direct effect
without mediation by standardizing each instance of account creation to five minutes
each, regardless of the condition.
These quantitative subjective measures were recorded by the system:


Creation and recall NASA Task Load Index (NASA-TLX) (Hart & Staveland,
1988) indices addressing mental demand, physical demand, temporal
demand, performance, effort, and frustration, each on a 7-point Likert scale



Creation and recall System Usability Scale (SUS) (Brooke, 1996) scores
addressing usability, each out of a total of 100 possible points



Perceived level of security on a 7-point Likert scale



Overall rating on a 7-point Likert scale
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Qualitative research was also used to assess the security and usability of the
authentication schemes. These qualitative subjective measures were collected by the
researcher:


Direct observation of the participant during the experimental tasks



Post-test open-ended interview questions about likes, dislikes, suggestions,
and perceived usability, security, and overall qualities

Due to the largely internal nature of the tasks, especially during recall, any video
recordings of participants would be low on visible actions. Therefore, it was decided
that a retrospective think-aloud protocol would not contribute much additional
information over direct observation and post-test interview questions.
Hypotheses
Prior to conducting the study, we proposed four primary hypotheses:
1. Recall effectiveness measures will be most favorable for the new system
conditions (#3 and #4).
2. Shoulder surfing security measures will not differ between authentication
schemes.
3. Cracking security measures will be least favorable overall for the usergenerated passphrase condition (#1).
4. Subjective usability measures will be least favorable for the Diceware10k
system-generated passphrase condition (#2).
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For the first primary hypothesis, the work from Chapters 3 and 4 indicated that
mnemonic aids improved recall effectiveness, although the conditions examined were
all based on system-generated passwords. The decoy masking technique from Chapter 5
should also reduce the number of errors made during the recall task. Since the new
system conditions (#3 and #4) integrate techniques designed to improve memorability
and usability, they should in theory exhibit the highest levels of recall effectiveness:
lower Damerau-Levenshtein distance, higher Jaro-Winkler proximity, and higher recall
success.
For the second primary hypothesis, the work from Chapter 5 indicated that the
use of decoy masking over conventional bullet masking had no adverse effect on the
level of security against shoulder surfing, although the study examined randomly
generated passwords instead of passphrases. The modifications to the decoy masking
system to support passphrases should preserve this strong level of security in the new
system conditions (#3 and #4) versus the bullet masking conditions (#1 and #2). We
expected to see no significant differences in Damerau-Levenshtein distance, JaroWinkler proximity, and resist success for shoulder surfing security.
For the third primary hypothesis, human attackers would not be expected to
come close to correctly guessing any legitimate passphrases. Against machine cracking,
the three system-generated passphrase conditions (#2, #3, and #4) should share similar
levels of security; each of these conditions is randomly generated and designed to
capture 40 bits of entropy. According to NIST guidelines (Burr et al., 2006), the user-
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generated passphrase condition (#1) is estimated to have 40 bits of entropy. However,
since users tend to choose patterned, less secure passwords and passphrases, it is still
probable that the user-generated passphrase condition would exhibit the lowest levels
of machine cracking security, as measured by lower cracking resist attempts.
For the fourth primary hypothesis, since users typically prefer to choose their
own passwords (Proctor et al., 2002), perceived usability would not likely be the lowest
for the user-generated passphrase condition (#1). When comparing the three systemgenerated passphrase conditions, the new system conditions (#3 and #4) integrate
techniques to improve usability over the Diceware10k system-generated passphrase
condition (#2). Research has also indicated that the large wordlist size of Diceware
systems leads to a reduction in usability (Leonhard & Venkatakrishnan, 2007), as
measured subjectively in our study by recall SUS and overall rating.
Participants
We recruited a fairly diverse set of 52 participants (28 males, 24 females),
ranging from age 20 to 61 (M=29), via word of mouth and e-mail. Fifty of our
participants returned between 7 and 11 days later for a second session; the other two
participants were lost to attrition. The 50 participants who returned were each
compensated with a $20 gift card for completing our study. The study utilized a withinsubject design where each participant received each condition. All participants were
assigned to conditions based on a balanced Latin square.
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The number of participants was determined based on a priori power analysis
using G*Power 3. With conservative estimates of medium effect size for ANOVA (f=.25)
(Cohen, 1988) and desired power of .95, the required sample size for within-subject
repeated measures ANOVA is 44. For comparison, using a large effect size for ANOVA
(f=.40) and desired power of .80 yields a required sample size of 16. We decided on 52
participants as a sort of buffer (power of .975) and with the knowledge that many study
designs tend to be underpowered rather than overpowered.
We considered running this study using Amazon Mechanical Turk, the most
popular crowdsourcing marketplace. However, there are several factors that make this
study poorly suited to Mechanical Turk:


Most importantly, the shoulder surfing data cannot be collected online and
must be collected in a laboratory setting.



Our implementation of user-created pictures is tightly coupled with the local
experimental setup to support automatic opening, saving, and closing.
Because the online drawing apps we found were determined to be poor and
unfamiliar to our pilot testers, an online replacement would rely on the
participant creating a picture on his or her own terms and then uploading the
picture to our server.



One of the largest advantages of Mechanical Turk is the rapid collection of
data. This is greatly neutralized in our study due to the turnaround time
required, although Mechanical Turk’s other large advantages (ecological
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validity and being able to easily recruit and pay tremendous numbers of
participants) would still remain. In addition, the turnaround time would lead
to particularly large levels of attrition when compared to a laboratory study.
By standardizing each instance of account creation to five minutes, we were
able to run multiple participants simultaneously in the laboratory, mitigating
some of the differences in data collection speed.
Procedure
Participants were first greeted, given a brief overview of the study, and asked to
complete an informed consent form. Notably, participants were informed that they
could be asked not to return for the second session if they violated instructions such as
not including the passphrase as text in a picture. Each condition of the within-subject
design was standardized at five minutes per condition, with a one-minute warning given
after four minutes had elapsed. Upon completing the creation phase for each condition,
participants were asked to complete NASA-TLX and SUS questionnaires. Once all four
accounts were created, participants answered some open-ended interview questions
regarding the account creation task and completed a basic demographic questionnaire;
because multiple participants were run at the same time, we employed a focus group
format. The amount of time required to complete the creation phase was approximately
thirty minutes.
Participants then moved to the recall phase. One of the four accounts was
randomly selected and participants were prompted to sign in within a maximum of five
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attempts; this process was then repeated for the remaining three accounts. After each
condition, participants were asked to complete NASA-TLX and SUS questionnaires, this
time regarding the recall task. Participants were also asked to provide a rating for the
perceived level of security and an overall assessment. Once all four accounts were
attempted, participants answered some open-ended interview questions about their
likes, dislikes, suggestions, and any other relevant opinions in a focus group setting. The
amount of time required to complete the recall phase was approximately fifteen
minutes.
Participants were specifically instructed not to write down their passphrases
after creating them. A week after each participant’s first session, he or she was invited
back for a second session to repeat the recall process. These recall tasks took
approximately fifteen minutes, as before. Participants were asked to return even if they
failed to recall one or more passphrases in the first session. Although they would be
unlikely to recall a passphrase that was previously forgotten, we still found it useful to
measure if their second-session attempt was farther away, the same, or even closer
than their first-session attempt.
At the end of the recall phase of the second session, for which the procedure
was largely identical to the recall phase of the first session, participants were also tasked
with attempting to guess the passphrases of four other accounts as closely as possible.
The system treated these adversaries in exactly the same manner as ordinary users:
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displaying any mnemonic aids, utilizing the same input masking techniques, and
allowing the same five attempts.
After attempting to guess the passphrases of other accounts, participants took
on the role of attackers to assess the security of the conditions against shoulder surfing.
After observing another user entering his or her passphrase – being allowed during that
time to see the mnemonic picture if applicable – the attacker was then asked to enter
the observed text as accurately as possible. The amount of time required to complete
the guessing and shoulder surfing tasks was approximately fifteen minutes.
In total, the amount of time required to complete both sessions of the study was
approximately seventy-five minutes: around forty-five minutes for the first session and
around thirty minutes for the second session. To combat attrition, the $20 gift cards
were not distributed until the second session was completed.
Results
Data Analysis
We used SPSS 19 for the data analysis. For the recall measures of time,
Damerau-Levenshtein distance, Jaro-Winkler proximity, NASA-TLX indices, and SUS
score, a repeated measures one-way ANOVA with a 95% confidence interval was used to
determine significance. A one-way ANOVA was used for the appropriate dependent
variables that were collected only once: creation NASA-TLX, creation SUS, perceived
security, overall rating, shoulder surfing and cracking Damerau-Levenshtein distance
and Jaro-Winkler proximity, and cracking resist attempts. We compared the combined
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means of the control system conditions (#1 and #2) versus the new system conditions
(#3 and #4) for recall Damerau-Levenshtein distance and Jaro-Winkler proximity using ttests as a priori planned comparisons, based on our first primary hypothesis.
Welch’s correction was used when variances were heterogeneous, which was
determined using Levene’s test. Mauchly’s test was used to check for the assumption of
sphericity. When sphericity was violated, the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was
applied. Since the recall time did not follow a normal distribution, a log transformation
was first applied to achieve normality. We also applied a log2 transformation to cracking
resist attempts to match the scale of entropy bits, in addition to the consideration of
normality.
Given significant results, Tukey’s HSD test showed which authentication schemes
differed significantly from one another. The Games-Howell test was used in place of
Tukey’s HSD when variances were heterogeneous. A simple effects test was used to
evaluate any possible interactions involving condition and session.
Recall success was analyzed using a generalized estimating equation to examine
the longitudinal effect across sessions. Shoulder surfing resist success, cracking resist
success, and individual session recall success were analyzed using a binary logistic
regression.
Machine Cracking
To determine cracking resist attempts, automated cracking was conducted on
the passphrases using John the Ripper, considered one of the most well regarded
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password cracking programs (Rao, Jha, & Kini, 2013). John the Ripper’s wordlist mode
was used with the largest dictionary provided by the developers. After eight hours of
cracking on a 3.3 GHz Intel Core i5 desktop computer, not a single passphrase was
identified.
We then tried John the Ripper’s incremental mode, which uses a Brute-Force
Markov (BFM) algorithm, as outlined in Kelley et al. (2011). The algorithm was trained
with the same wordlist, which was used to build a Markov chain (with states and
probabilistic transitions to subsequent states) for the password space. This Markov
chain was then followed while cracking. After another eight hours of cracking on the
same 3.3 GHz Intel Core i5 computer, again, not a single passphrase was identified.
Unsurprisingly, John the Ripper and all the other password crackers currently available
are known to perform poorly against passphrases (Rao, Jha, & Kini, 2013).
Finally, we built a simple deterministic passphrase cracker based on word
frequency analysis, trained on the wordlist derived from the study. This passphrase
cracker will always first attempt the combination of all the most common words for
each position, and then proceed to guess the next most likely combination and repeat
until the entire passphrase space is exhausted.
For example, if a total of three users selected I love cats, I hate cats, and I love
dogs as their passphrases, the deterministic cracker would first attempt I love cats
followed by I love dogs, I hate cats, and I hate dogs. The total number of possible
passphrases in this simplified example is

, and the cracker would attempt
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all four possibilities in descending likelihood. The specific order is determined because
love appears more frequently than hate, and cats appears more frequently than dogs.
Because certain words appear more frequently, passphrases containing these words
would be considered less secure and would take fewer attempts to crack. Moreover, a
set of passphrases would be considered less secure, the more overlap there is between
individual passphrases.
Typical password crackers are designed to operate on password hashes since
normally the passwords are unknown. On the other hand, our deterministic passphrase
cracker can be fed the passphrases and simply calculate the required number of
attempts without having to iterate through all the individual combinations. At this point,
the cracking resist attempts could be determined after several minutes of running on
the 3.3 GHz Intel Core i5 computer.
Objective Measures
Efficiency. The results indicate a significant difference for first-session recall time
(F=8.99, p <.001, η2=.087). The recall time in seconds was shorter for Special English
(M=28.9) than all other conditions, as seen in Figure 25. For the second session, there
was no significant difference for recall time (F=1.88, p=.138, η2=.025). The average recall
time in seconds for Special English increased from before (M=44.9) but remained the
shortest condition. There was no interaction effect of condition and session on recall
time (F=1.23, p=.299, η2=.018).
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Figure 6.5. 1st-session recall time (smaller values indicate increased efficiency)

Effectiveness. The differences in recall Damerau-Levenshtein distance were
statistically significant for both the first session (F=4.95, p=.003, η2=.045) and second
session (F=6.26, p=.001, η2=.077). However, the interaction effect of condition and
session on Damerau-Levenshtein distance was not significant (F=0.940, p=.422,
η2=.014). For the first session, Special English (M=0.380) was significantly shorter than
Diceware10k (M=3.23), as shown in Figure 26. Although the mean of User-generated
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(M=3.50) was even higher than that of Diceware10k, the greater variance in the Usergenerated condition meant that it did not differ significantly from Special English. We
did observe a significant effect (t=3.05, p=.003, d=.424) when comparing the new
system conditions (Special English and Sentence: M=0.740) with the control system
conditions (User-generated and Diceware10k: M=3.37). For the second session, Special
English (M=2.12) was significantly shorter than both User-generated (M=7.00) and
Diceware10k (M=7.62). Sentence (M=2.94) was also significantly shorter than
Diceware10k. These results can be seen in Figure 27. We also found a significant effect
(t=4.02, p<.001, d=.568) when comparing the new system conditions (M=2.53) with the
control system conditions (M=7.31).
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Figure 6.6. 1st-session Damerau-Levenshtein distance (smaller values indicate increased effectiveness)
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Figure 6.7. 2nd-session Damerau-Levenshtein distance (smaller values indicate increased effectiveness)

Likewise, the differences in recall Jaro-Winkler proximity were statistically
significant for both the first session (F=4.16, p=.008, η2=.059) and second session
(F=9.96, p<.001, η2=.147). Recall Jaro-Winkler proximity was strongly correlated with
Damerau-Levenshtein distance for both the first session (r=-.834, p<.001) and second
session (r=-.834, p<.001). Again, the interaction effect of condition and session on JaroWinkler proximity was not significant (F=3.026, p=.079, η2=.044). For the first session,
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Special English (M=.990) and Sentence (M=.985) were both closer than Diceware10k
(M=.898), as seen in Figure 28. We also found a significant effect (t=-3.47, p=.001,
d=.481) when comparing the new system conditions (M=.988) with the control system
conditions (M=.911). For the second session, Special English (M=.956) and Sentence
(M=.955) were again both closer than Diceware10k (M=.764), as seen in Figure 29.
There was also a significant effect (t=-5.23, p<.001, d=.739) when comparing the new
system conditions (M=.956) with the control system conditions (M=.811).

109

Figure 6.8. 1st-session Jaro-Winkler proximity (larger values indicate increased effectiveness)
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Figure 6.9. 2nd-session Jaro-Winkler proximity (larger values indicate increased effectiveness)

As with the other recall effectiveness measures, the effect of passphrase on
success was also determined to be statistically significant for both the first session
(χ2=20.4, p<.001) and second session (χ2=36.0, p<.001). There was no significant
interaction effect of condition and session on recall success (χ2=1.19, p=.275). Figure 30
shows that the first-session success rate was 94.2% for Special English, 92.3% for
Sentence, 76.9% for User-generated, and 65.4% for Diceware10k. As seen in Figure 31,
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the second-session success rate was 82.0% for Sentence, 80.0% for Special English,
50.0% for User-generated, and 34.0% for Diceware10k. Significance was also found
when examining system type (control or new) instead of condition for both the first
session (χ2=18.5, p<.001) and the second session (χ2=33.3, p<.001).

Figure 6.10. 1st-session recall success rate (larger values indicate increased effectiveness)
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Figure 6.11. 2nd-session recall success rate (larger values indicate increased effectiveness)

Security. There was a statistically significant difference for the DamerauLevenshtein distance between the shoulder surfers’ guesses and the actual passwords
(F=43.0, p<.001, η2=.397). As shown in Figure 32, Sentence (M=30.5) was longer than
User-generated (M=23.0) and Special English (M=19.9), and all three conditions were
longer than Diceware10k (M=9.68). It is worth emphasizing that longer passphrases
naturally result in larger Damerau-Levenshtein distances when the guesses are
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unrelated. When looking instead at Jaro-Winkler proximity, as seen in Figure 33, there
was no significant effect (F=2.14, p=.097, η2=.032). However, Jaro-Winkler proximity did
correlate with Damerau-Levenshtein distance (r=-.518, p<.001). No passphrase was
guessed correctly, so the shoulder surfing resist success rate was 100% for all
conditions.

Figure 6.12. Shoulder surfing Damerau-Levenshtein distance (larger values indicate increased security)
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Figure 6.13. Shoulder surfing Jaro-Winkler proximity (smaller values indicate increased security)

For cracking security against human attackers, there was a statistically significant
difference for the Damerau-Levenshtein distance between adversaries’ guesses and the
actual passwords (F=43.4, p<.001, η2=.399). As seen in Figure 34, Sentence (M=31.5) and
User-generated (M=28.3) were both farther than Special English (M=20.8), and all three
conditions were farther than Diceware10k (M=16.2). There was also a statistically
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significant difference for the Jaro-Winkler proximity, which correlated with DamerauLevenshtein distance (r=-.518, p<.001), between guesses and the actual passwords
(F=19.5, p<.001, η2=.230). For Jaro-Winkler proximity, Diceware10k (M=.404) and Usergenerated (M=.457) were farther than both Special English (M=.568) and Sentence
(M=.589), as seen in Figure 35. Again, no passphrase was guessed correctly, so the
cracking resist success rate was 100% for all passphrases.

Figure 6.14. Cracking Damerau-Levenshtein distance (larger values indicate increased security)
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Figure 6.15. Cracking Jaro-Winkler proximity (smaller values indicate increased security)

For cracking security against machine attackers, the effect of passphrase on the
log2-transformed cracking resist attempts was found to be statistically significant
(F=78.1, p<.001, η2=.632). Special English (M=36.0), Sentence (M=34.6), and
Diceware10k (M=34.4), as the system-generated conditions, all took a greater number
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of attempts to crack on average than did the User-generated condition (M=23.8). This
effect can be seen in Figure 36.
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Figure 6.16. log2-transformed cracking resist attempts (larger values indicate increased security)

Subjective Measures
Workload. For the creation task, there was no significant effect of condition on
any of the NASA-TLX indices: mental demand (F=1.37, p=.253, η2=.020), physical
demand (F=2.39, p=.070, η2=.034), temporal demand (F=2.40, p=.069, η2=.034),
performance (F=1.31, p=.272, η2=.019), effort (F=2.04, p=.109, η2=.029), and frustration
(F=0.399, p=.754, η2=.006). During the first recall session, the only index that was
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statistically significant was mental demand (F=3.44, p=.019, η2=.049). Special English
(M=2.29) was rated as being less mentally demanding than Diceware10k (M=3.60). For
the second recall session, there was no significant effect of condition on any of the
indices, including mental demand (F=2.178, p=.092, η2=.032), which was now rated at
M=3.44 for Special English. In addition, there was no interaction effect of condition and
session on any of the NASA-TLX indices.
Usability. During the creation task, there was no significant effect of condition
on SUS (F=1.50, p=.216, η2=.022), as seen in Figure 37. For first-session recall, the effect
of condition on SUS was significant (F=4.29, p=.007, η2=.058). Figure 38 shows that
Special English (M=72.9) was rated as more usable than Diceware10k (M=59.9) and
User-generated (M=58.0). As seen in Figure 39, the effect of condition on SUS was also
significant for second-session recall (F=7.62, p<.001, η2=.110). Sentence (M=76.0) and
Special English (M=71.7) were both considered more usable than User-generated
(M=56.0). Sentence was also found to be significantly more usable than Diceware10k
(M=62.1). There was no interaction effect of condition and session on SUS (F=1.652,
p=.179, η2=.025).
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Figure 6.17. Creation SUS score (larger values indicate increased usability)
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Figure 6.18. 1st-session recall SUS score (larger values indicate increased usability)
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Figure 6.19. 2nd-session recall SUS score (larger values indicate increased usability)
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Security. There was no significant difference for the effect of condition on
perceived level of security (F=0.638, p=.591, η2=.010), as seen in Figure 40.
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Figure 6.20. Perceived security on a 7-point Likert scale (larger values indicate increased security)

Overall. There was a significant difference for the effect of condition on overall
rating (F=9.73, p<.001, η2=.130), as seen in Figure 41. Special English (M=5.02), Sentence
(M=4.98), and User-generated (M=4.88) were all rated more highly overall than was
Diceware10k (M=3.52).
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Figure 6.21. Overall rating on a 7-point Likert scale (larger values indicate increased usability and security)

Discussion
Hypotheses
Our first primary hypothesis, that recall effectiveness measures would be most
favorable for the new system conditions, was supported by the results. This was the
case when comparing between conditions and also when comparing control and new
system conditions. As a whole, the second-session recall success rates (82% for
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Sentence, 80% for Special English, 50% for User-generated, and 34% for Diceware10k)
were somewhat higher than expected, given our results from previous studies in
Chapters 3 and 4 on passwords and mnemonics.
Nevertheless, success rates around 80% would not initially seem to inspire
tremendous confidence in the practicality of real-world implementation. However, for
the sake of experimental design, we intended for our tasks to be more difficult than in
typical scenarios. Participants were tasked to create four accounts in a row (resulting in
interference between passphrases), could not write down or practice their passphrases,
and were not incentivized for higher performance. Therefore, we believe that in
standard real-world situations, long-term success rates for our new system would
increase past the 80% level.
For the control system conditions, our finding that the success rates were
somewhat higher than expected was likely due to the controls in this study being a bit
more memorable than the previous control condition of passwords generated with
random letters. For the new system conditions, higher success rates were likely due in
large part to the login benefits of error correction and decoy masking. There were also
fewer words to remember with the new system conditions than with the previous 7word sentence structure.
Our second primary hypothesis, that shoulder surfing security measures would
not differ between authentication schemes, was also supported by the results. Although
there were significant effects as measured by Damerau-Levenshtein distance, this was
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largely due to the differences in length between passphrases. (Regardless, the fact that
our new system results in longer passphrases is a valid contributor to increased security
against shoulder surfing combined with machine attack.) Because of the need for a
length-independent baseline, Jaro-Winkler proximity was a more useful measure, and it
showed no significant differences between conditions. This indicates that the shoulder
surfing security of decoy masking was preserved through the transition from passwords
to passphrases.
Our third primary hypothesis was that cracking security measures would be least
favorable overall for User-generated, which we argue was also borne out by the results.
For cracking security against human attackers, the Jaro-Winkler proximity indicated that
User-generated and Diceware10k performed better than Special English and Sentence;
in other words, the mnemonic pictures leaked some information to attackers. However,
the average proximity for all conditions fell between .4 and .6. These values are not very
high, and the new system conditions were indeed far closer to the guesses of the
control system conditions than insecurity. To put it in another perspective, attackers
came closer to guessing the legitimate passphrase while shoulder surfing with the bullet
masking of the control system conditions than they did while guessing passphrases
based on the pictures of the new system conditions. Moreover, due to the nature of
passphrases, the closest by Damerau-Levenshtein distance that any attacker got to a
legitimate passphrase was farther away than the entire password length in our previous
studies in Chapters 3 and 4.
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For cracking security against machine attackers, User-generated was found to
take 224 attempts on average, over 10 bits less secure than any other condition. (Since
the entire passphrase space will only be exhausted by machine guessing in the worst
case scenario, and because all possible passphrases are far from equally likely, this does
not mean that User-generated was found to exhibit 24 bits of entropy.) Although this
effect is extremely significant from a statistical standpoint, and over 1000 times fewer
attempts required also seems significant from a practical standpoint, we cannot say with
absolute certainty that the difference matters at this point in time.
For the fourth primary hypothesis, that subjective usability measures would be
least favorable for Diceware10k, the results were different than expected. While
Diceware10k did indeed perform worse than the new system conditions for first-session
and second-session recall SUS, User-generated performed just as poorly. This was
surprising to us because users typically prefer to create their own passwords or
passphrases (Proctor et al., 2002). Since there were no significant differences for
creation SUS, it is likely that recall SUS was highly affected by lower performance for the
control system conditions in the recall tasks. While Shay et al. (2012) found that
participants generally rated system-generated passphrases as difficult and annoying, we
believe that the mnemonic pictures, error correction, and decoy masking in our new
systems improved their usability.
It came as no surprise to us that we found no significant differences for
participants’ ratings of perceived security, as users would not be expected to
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understand the underlying implications of various design decisions on security.
Interestingly, Diceware10k did perform the worst in an overall rating that combined
usability and security. User-generated outperformed Diceware10k for the overall rating,
even though they performed at the same level for creation SUS, recall SUS, and
perceived security. Perhaps this is because, while participants could not process their
greater dislike for Diceware10k in terms of specific dimensions such as usability and
security, they did feel that they disliked it the most, overall.
Observations
We directly observed a wide range of reactions from participants, demonstrating
the effect of individual differences. Some participants were smiling and laughing the
entire time, while others appeared to take the experimental tasks very seriously or
became frustrated more easily. From what we could tell, these differences were mostly
unrelated to success at the experimental tasks and were more likely related to
personality.
There was a good deal of uniformity in passphrase creation strategy for the usergenerated condition, even though the only requirement was to be at least 24 characters
in length. All accounts were created using true phrases (e.g., unlike
Samantha1234567890!!!!!!). The vast majority of user-created passphrases included
spaces between words. Symbols, numbers, and upper case letters were almost never
used; when they were, they would inevitably be capitalized first words or proper nouns,
apostrophes, or trailing exclamation points. Very occasionally, participants used
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intentional misspellings or letter-to-number obfuscations (e.g., 0 instead of o). But
overall, participants jumped at the opportunity to create an authentication secret with
the simplicity of plain language.
One participant selected a phrase in a foreign language, and another strung
together four names that are not commonly seen in the United States. While these may
have been admirable attempts to bolster security, passphrase crackers can be trained
on foreign phrases and names just as simply as English ones. Any additions past plain
English, such as capitalization, punctuation, and letter-to-number obfuscations, are
particularly poor from both usability and security perspectives, as they introduce extra
information that must be remembered, but these additions tend to be easy for
passphrase crackers to predict.
Other participants selected phrases based on movie quotations, song lyrics, and
online memes. These insecure selections typically occur when users are allowed to
select their own phrases (Kuo et al., 2006). While Kuo et al. (2006) found that 65% of
user-generated passphrases in their study were found when submitted as exact quotes
to Google, this held for 42% of our user-generated passphrases. In any case, this idea
suggests the possibility of preventing users from creating passphrases that appear in an
online search.
In contrast to passphrase creation, picture creation strategies proved to be
diverse. Most participants started drawing relatively quickly, but some adopted a
different strategy of thinking about the passphrase for a minute or more before
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beginning to draw. The pictures themselves demonstrated a mix of black and white,
colors, shapes, symbols, freeform, text or letters (not taken directly from the
passphrase), and different levels of artistry or drawing ability (or more charitably,
abstractness). Some tried to paint a holistic picture, while others depicted distinct subpictures for individual words in sequence. Participants also finished at different times.
Some were completely finished before the one-minute warning and spent the rest of
the allotted time looking at their picture. Others used the entire five minutes and had to
be explicitly told to stop drawing.
When it came time to guess the passphrases of other accounts, participants
almost universally seemed amused or exasperated at the task. We made sure to stress
that we did not expect anyone to be able to completely guess another passphrase, even
with picture support. Some participants were quite excited to guess others’ pictures and
laughed or said they were cute but had no idea what they were supposed to be.
Participants mostly exhibited similar reactions of exasperation when asked to
shoulder surf, although several participants claimed they caught part of an entered
passphrase, usually with decoy masking. A few participants even claimed they thought
they might have caught the whole thing, but as no passphrase was correctly guessed,
the results did not support any of these claims.
We also observed that the defense against shoulder surfing seemed to have
more to do with the person typing than with the attacker. Behaviors such as pausing
after every word, double checking before submitting, and typing slowly in general would
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create potential opportunities for attack. This is why we instructed participants to
prioritize speed over accuracy while using decoy masking, reminding them of the built-in
error correction.
We noticed several different deducible reasons why participants would fail to
sign in successfully, rather than simply forgetting entirely. Many participants expressed
disbelief that they had, in particular, forgotten the passphrase they had previously
chosen. Memory is fallible, which is why mnemonic aids are so valuable.
For user-generated passphrases, sometimes it was as simple as neglecting an
exclamation point at the end, leaving out the at the beginning of a phrase, mixing one
and 1, forgetting capitalization, or making a typographical error. In this last case, since
the user doesn’t realize the mistake, he or she will try incorrect variations of the
legitimate passphrase on subsequent attempts, proceeding down a cycle of failure.
Besides the typographical errors, these other types of mistakes suggest that from an
information processing perspective, the memory failure was possibly due to an
encoding error rather than a retrieval error.
Since we did not ask participants to confirm their passphrases during creation,
we thought that perhaps some users might have made a typographical error during
creation instead of login. However, when we examined the passphrases, we noticed
that this phenomenon only occurred for one participant. Interestingly, a couple of
participants intentionally introduced a misspelling into a passphrase and successfully
remembered this modification later during recall.
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For Diceware10k, unfamiliar words were troublesome. Symbol-based “words”
also caused difficulty, and participants would also forget the order of the words.
Unsurprisingly, the single most common reason why participants had trouble with this
condition was simply that they were assigned a randomly generated passphrase without
any mnemonic aids.
For the new system conditions, because of the mnemonic pictures, participants
very rarely experienced a complete inability to remember any aspect of the passphrase.
Participants were frequently off by one word, substituting another word with a similar
meaning. For the sentence-based passphrase, the animal and the food tended to be
easier to remember, while the food adjective and verb tended to give the most
problems. This same pattern also held for attackers’ guesses of pictures.
Responses
One of the most consistent statements from participants answering the openended interview questions was just how much they enjoyed taking part in the study,
compared to other studies they had participated in. Several participants exclaimed that
they were going to go home and play a game of Pictionary. Another responded that the
Sentence passphrase condition reminded him of the Apples to Apples card game, based
on intriguing or unexpected word combinations; others compared the condition to Mad
Libs.
While participants almost unanimously liked the mnemonic pictures, perhaps the
greatest positive response was actually for the typographical error correction.
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Participants felt relieved that they did not have to type their passphrase absolutely
correctly, although some felt the need to correct their mistakes regardless. Sometimes,
we observed users making a mistake and never realizing it; without error correction,
they would have failed the login attempt and not understand why they had failed.
Participants also expressed a great deal of appreciation for decoy masking. This
was demonstrated primarily not during the decoy masking tasks but during the standard
bullet masking tasks, as the lack of feedback in those cases proved frustrating. Several
participants particularly liked how the color and position of the legitimate entry was
consistent for every recall task for a particular passphrase.
Another potentially underappreciated feature of our new system was allowing
participants a choice of four passphrases for Special English. Some participants
remarked that they liked having the feeling of choice in that condition rather than
simply the luck of the draw as in the other system-generated conditions.
The passphrase scheme that participants disliked the most was Diceware10k.
There was certainly the highest degree of variance in assigned or created passphrases
with this condition, as the system could randomly assign three easy words or three
difficult words. Naturally, participants who received words that they did not recognize
professed a major dislike for the system; a few participants wondered why there
couldn’t have been definition tooltips for this condition rather than for Special English,
where the definitions weren’t typically needed. Participants also disliked how symbol
characters (e.g., in 50%, 1/8, or !!) are included in the Diceware10k wordlist. Most
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importantly, participants disliked that no mnemonic picture was available for this
condition.
The single most insightful suggestion from a participant was an enhancement to
strengthen the phrase-based decoy masking when a typographical error has been made
that the system has not yet corrected. In this situation, the system would also introduce
a typographical error in the decoys and then correct all lines of displayed text
simultaneously. The system would know what the correct passphrase is, and while it
would not be desirable to correct all errors immediately (or else it would be impossible
for an attacker to fail during login), the proposed idea should be feasible.
Later, however, we realized that this change would likely be insecure against
passphrase guessers, as an attacker could simply try each character one letter at a time
until identifying the correct character as the one that does not induce a typographical
error in the decoys. The threat of this type of attack could possibly be mitigated by
detecting if an attacker is employing this tactic and then locking the account, but
legitimate users may then be caught in the crossfire. Along with the consideration of
selecting decoys similar to the legitimate passphrase, these examples demonstrate that
there is often a tradeoff not only between usability and security, but also between
security measures against different types of attacks.
Finally, several participants noted that getting to play the role of an attacker was
both fun and informative. A few participants suggested that this new perspective would
probably enable them to draw more effective and secure pictures in the future.
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Conclusion
We developed a new authentication system based on passphrases instead of
passwords. Our new system incorporates a user-generated mnemonic picture displayed
during login, definition tooltips, error correction to reduce typographical errors, a
decoy-based input masking technique, and the choice of utilizing either a specialized
wordlist or a sentence template. The idea is that these added features work particularly
well with passphrases and help to address the usability shortcomings that have slowed
the adoption of passphrases.
We conducted a study to evaluate our new system with a customized 1450-word
list and our new system with a 6-word sentence structure against the control conditions
of a user-created passphrase of at least 24 characters and a system-generated
passphrase using a 10326-word list. We found that using the new system conditions,
memorability was improved and security was equivalent to or better than the control
conditions. Usability and overall ratings also favored the new system conditions over the
control conditions.

137

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
The major contribution of our research to the field of digital authentication is in
facilitating a transition from passwords to usable passphrases, resulting in increased
security and, potentially, usability. The key lies in addressing the traditional usability
issues of passphrases, which have hindered wider adoption. This was accomplished
through the integration of passphrases with our component innovations: a specialized
wordlist and sentence template, definition tooltips, user-generated mnemonic pictures
for recall, error correction while typing, and a decoy-based input masking technique.
We recommend that current authentication systems be steadily adapted to our
research contributions and findings. In computer security, drastic changes should never
happen overnight, but regular progress is always necessary. Altogether, our
contributions represent individual techniques for optimizing usability and security, but
one practical takeaway is that careful thought and inventive ideas can overcome
obstacles in the constantly evolving area of computer security. As new challenges will
always arise, we must be willing to face these challenges with an open mind.
One topic for future work is separating out which aspects of our new system
contribute the most beneficial effects. However, several different aspects of our new
system would be difficult or infeasible to integrate with existing passphrase schemes.
For example, mnemonic pictures are only effective when the meanings of those words
are well known. Error correction only works well when the components of a passphrase
are clearly defined words, with a low amount of overlap between possible words (e.g.,
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bun and bin would not be desirable to correct to one another, as they are too similar).
Still, knowing what the more or less significant features are would help us to improve
them and integrate them into a more effective combination.
Another interesting research angle would be to break down the entire range of
memory failures into its component pieces: encoding errors, storage errors, and
retrieval errors. By examining the different ways in which users can fail to recall their
passphrases, we can better understand how to provide specially tailored mnemonic aids
that help them remember those passphrases or other security information.
Studying performance in the wild versus in a laboratory setting would also be
important for assessing ecological validity. It may be possible to conduct studies of real
accounts, over long time periods, or using Amazon Mechanical Turk. In this situation, we
could also measure how much time users would really spend on account creation or
login if left to their own devices. More rigorous research into how users actually create
real passphrases would also have benefits in understanding passphrase memorability
and security.
We can also work on developing more sophisticated methods of passphrase
cracking to better evaluate the security of passphrase systems. Not much attention has
been given yet to passphrase cracking because the vast majority of authentication
secrets in the wild are currently passwords, not passphrases. As the situation changes in
the future, passphrase cracking will become more lucrative and will inevitably improve.
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Our final consideration is especially interesting from a user experience
standpoint: how to foster understanding of best practice using our new system or any
other novel innovations in computer security. As system designers, how do we prevent
users from defeating the security features imposed or suggested by the system? This is a
classic question in human factors research, and part of the answer could involve
training, motivation, or simply understanding some of the reasons why users behave the
way they do regarding computer security.
Our research presents innovative techniques that improve on the usability and
security of existing authentication systems. We feel that further development of these
techniques will lead to even greater improvements in the future. In the end, we hope
that by focusing attention on the usability of security-critical computer systems, we will
inspire other researchers and practitioners to strive to design systems that are both
secure and usable.
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